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20. This distinction, however, has been disapproved by several eminent Judges in England [see the observations of Mansfield, C.J., in Thorley v. Lord Kerry (1812) 13 Rev. Rep., 635: 4 Taunt., 355 (363); Lynch v. Knight (1861) 9 H.L.C. 577 (594); Roberts v. Roberts (1864) 33 L.J., Q.B., 249.] In the case of Parvathi v. Mannar (1884) I.L.R., 8 Mad., 175, Turner, C.J., sitting with Muthusami Ayyar, J., condemned the distinction which exists under the English law between slander and libel. He thus expressed himself:

25. If a man commits an assault upon another, though he may not actually touch him at all, or if he lifts up his cane or his fist in a threatening "manner at another, or strikes him, however slightly, he is liable to an action for damage; and one fails to see what difference in principle exists between a case like this and a case where a man offers another gross insult in the presence of other people--insult calculated to bring him into contempt and to cause him mental torture.

26. According to the common law in this country, as expounded in the text of the sages, verbal abuses are punishable (see the Sacred Books of the East by Professor Max Muller, vol. 7, p. 270 and vol. 33, p. 207; Mandlik's Byabahara Mayukha, p. 232). And I find that ever since the establishment of the High Court in this province, it has almost invariably been held that verbal abuse, though no actual damage has been caused, is actionable. In the case of Kanoo Mundle v. Rahamoollah Mundle (1864) W.R., Gap. No. 269, Norman, C.J., expressed himself as follows: "The words, which are of the coarsest abuse, do undoubtedly impute that to the plaintiff which would, if believed, have been hurtful to the feelings of his family and have lowered his character in respect of his caste, and the uttering of them, therefore, amounts to an offence under Section 499 of the Penal Code. Applying the test familiar to English law, the uttering of the words in question, standing by itself, was a wrong, and therefore gave to the individual aggrieved by it a right of action independently of any proof of special damage or actual pecuniary injury;" and later on he observed: "No doubt actions for slander are often vexatious. But to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands, and for the preservation of peace and order, it is a matter of the greatest importance that Courts of Justice should afford an effectual remedy to persons feeling themselves aggrieved by wanton and virulent abuse." The same view was adopted in the case of Gholam Hossein v. Hur Gobind Dass (1864) 1 W.R., 19; in Tukee v. Khoshdel Biswas (1866) 6 W.R., 151; in Osseemooddeen v. Futteh Mahomed (1867) 7 W.R., 259; Gour Chunder Puteedundee v. Clay (1867) 8 W.R., 256; as also in the case of Sreenath Mookerjee v. Komul Kurmokar (1871) 16 W.R., 83, where Mitter, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, observed as follows: "We think that the Judge is wrong in holding that the abusive words complained of by the plaintiff in this case are not actionable. It is true that the plaintiff might have instituted proceedings against the defendant in the Criminal Court; but his failure to do so does not deprive him of his right to bring a suit in the Civil Court. The case is governed by the ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kali Kumar Mitter v. Ramgati Bhattacharjee (1870) 16 W.R., 84, note: 6 B.L.R., Ap., 99. The words alleged to have been used were certainly such as to wound the feelings of the plaintiff." And he remanded the case for the purpose of a finding upon the question whether the defendant did use the words imputed to him or not. In the case of Srikant Boy v. Satcoori Shaha (1878) 3 C.L.R., 181, Mitter and Maclean, JJ., took the same view of the matter. I find also that in the case of Ibin Hossein v. Haidar (1885) 1. L.R., 12 Cal., 109, Field, J., sitting with O' Kinealy, J., took practically the same view of the law; and he observed: "We do not propose to lay down as a general rule that the use of every kind of abusive language is actionable. But we think that language, which, having regard to the definition of defamation in the Indian Penal Code, is calculated to injure the reputation, language which, having regard to the respectability and position of the person abused, is calculated to outrage his feelings, lower the estimation in which he is held by persons of his own class, and so bring him into disrepute, is actionable. We think there is no doubt that the language alleged to have been used in this case comes within this principle:" and in so deciding the learned Judges followed the rulings to which I have adverted. In the case of Trailokyanath Ghose v. Chundra Nath Dutt (1885) I.L.R., 12 Cal., 424, Prinsep and Macpherson, JJ., adopted the same view, and followed the case of Srikant Roy v. Satcoori Shaha (1878) 3 C.L.R., 181, and the opinion expressed in Parvathi v. Mannar (1884) I.L.R., 8 Mad., 175, to which I have already referred. And, lastly, we have a very recent case decided by Banerjee and Wilkins, J.J., (unreported) where the learned Judges, upon the point whether slander is actionable in the absence of special damage, expressed themselves as follows: "Though the rule of English law requires proof of special damage to sustain an action for slander except in certain cases, and though there is some conflict of authority in this country, the later cases are in favour of the view that where the abusive language used is such that, having regard to the respectability and position of the person abused, it is calculated to outrage his feelings or lower the estimation in which he is held by persons of his own class, and so bring him into disrepute, it is actionable without proof of special damage." [Dina Ram Sarma v. Jogeswar Sarma (1898) 2 C.W.N., cxxiii].

27. In the other provinces also, very nearly the same view of the law has been adopted. In Kashiram v. Bhadu Bapuji (1870) 7 Bom., H.C., A.C., 17, Couch, C.J., followed the rulings of the Calcutta High Court, and he held that the case must be decided according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience; and he was of opinion that mere verbal abuse without proof of actual damage was actionable. In the case of Parvathi v. Mannar (1884) I.L.R., 8 Mad., 175, the learned Chief Justice, among other matters, observed: "It is often impossible to bring specific proof of the damage which a man may suffer in his business or in his friendships from such an injury. The injury may be occasioned before he has any opportunity of rebutting the slander, and the memory of the slander may survive its contradiction, and may at any time influence his neighbours unconsciously to his disadvantage; nor is the suffering trivial which such a wrong may inflict on its victim." It will be observed that although Turner, C.J., in one portion of his judgment, expressed that "mere hasty expressions spoken in anger or vulgar abuse to which no hearer would attribute any set purpose to injure character would of course not be actionable," still he held that "the action should be allowed where the defamation is such as would cause substantial pain and annoyance to the person defamed, though actual proof of damage estimable in money may not be forthcoming, "and that" a distinction should be drawn between cases where the slanderer acts from mere carelessness, or in an honest but mistaken belief as to his duty, and cases where the slanderer is insolent without any provocation, or is influenced by a desire to gratify his enmity. "In the case of Abdul Hakim v. Tej Chandra Mukarji (1881) I.L.R., 3 All., 815. Straight, J., held that the law of defamation, which should be applied in suits in India for defamation, is that laid down in the Penal Code, and not the English law of libel and slander, and he observed that "the state of society and the condition of things in the two countries is wholly dissimilar, and to lay it down as an inflexible rule that any false and malicious statements, no matter how defamatory, may be made with impunity if only embodied in a petition filed in reference to some pending case, could not but entail the most mischievous consequences."

29. Against this large array of cases in support of the plaintiff's contention, some cases have been quoted on the other side. In the case of Komul Chunder Bose v. Nobin Chunder Ghose (1868) 10 W.R., 184, where a suit was brought to obtain damages for defamation contained in a letter written and sent by the defendant to plaintiff, and where the only damage alleged was the injury to plaintiff's feelings, it was held that such injury was not in itself a ground for awarding damages in a civil action. No authority is quoted for the decision, and the earlier rulings of this Court do not seem to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges. In the case of Phoolbasee Koer v. Parjun Singh (1869) 12 W.R., 369, it was held that mere verbal abuse without proof of actual damage is not actionable. Here also no authority is quoted and the earlier cases of this Court do not appear to have been considered. In the case of Chunder Nath Dhur v. Isurree Dossee (1872) 18 W.R., 531, Kemp and Glover, JJ., held that though mere verbal abuse without consequent injury would give no claim for damages, yet where a person of some position had been assaulted and grossly abused, and where her reputation must have been injured and her feelings outraged, she was entitled to damages. In the case of Nil Madhub Mookerjee v. Dookeeram Khottah (1874) 15 B.L.R., 161, where the question was raised whether an action for slander could be brought jointly against several defendants, it was held by Pontifex, J., that it could not be so brought, because each person sued for verbal slander was responsible only for what he himself had uttered. And leave was granted to the plaintiff to elect any one of the defendants to sue. The learned Judge, however, seems to have then expressed a doubt whether the words complained of were libellous per se; and it was thrown out that unless special damage was proved the Court would be very much reluctant to give any damage. I take it that the question which arises in this case was not really decided then. In the case of Mahomed Ismail Khan v. Mahomed Tahir (1873) 6 N.W.P., H.C. 38, where an action was brought for damage for defamation contained in two letters written and sent by the defendant to the plaintiffs, but where no other publication was alleged and no other injury than the injury to the feelings was caused, Turner, J., followed the decision in the case of Komul Chunder Bose v. Nob in Chunder Ghose (1868) 10 W.E., 184, and held that the suit was not maintainable. The earlier rulings of the Calcutta High Court do not seem to have been then brought to the learned Judge's notice, and I take it that he considerably modified his opinion when as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court he decided the case of Parvathi v. Mannar (1884) I.L.E., 8 Mad., 175.