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1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.3.97 passed by Shri M. M. Sur, Additional District Judge, tenth Court at Alipore in Title Appeal No. 231 of 1996 by which the Judgment and decree dated 31.5.96 passed by Smt. C. Vora, Munslf of the second Court at Alipore in Title Suit No. 195 of 1996 was confirmed.

2. At the time of admission hearing before a Divisional Bench of this Court on 3.9.97, the following substantial question of law wds formulated :

"Whether the learned Courts below granted decree without considering the relevant criteria for eviction of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal requirement, and in any event, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, learned Courts below failed to consider as to whether the decree for partial eviction would serve the purpose of the plaintiff."

8. Before taking into consideration the subsequent events, first of all it is necessary to consider how the Courts below examined the requirement of the plaintiff as reasonable and whether the relevant criteria for eviction of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal requirement were consider or not and whether the Courts below failed to consider as to whether the decree of partial eviction would serve the purpose of the plaintiff. It is already stated above that the suit building as a two-syoreyed one and the entire first floor is in occupation of the plaintiff-landlord and the entire ground floor Is In occupation of the defend ant-appellant It Is proved by the plaintiff on the basis of title deed and other papers that he Is the owner of the suit building. It is also admitted that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff and that the tenancy was determined by a notice to quit duly served on the defendant appellant. Both the Courts came to a finding that the ground of causing nuisance and harassment to the plaintiff and the breach of the provisions of (m), (o), (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act were not pressed by the plaintiff and accordingly, those were answered in the negative and In favour of the appellant-defendant. Actually the learned counsel for the appellant also did not agitate the foregoing points. He also did not attack the findings of the first appellate Court as regards the proof of requirement of the plaintiff In respect of five rooms. He based his argument to the effect that as the requirement of the plaintiff was found to have been proved and restricted to five rooms out of the six rooms in the suit building, the defendant-appellant is entitled to get one room in his possession and in fact, he clarified that the defendant appellant is agreeable to part with possession of two rooms in his possession for meeting the requirement of the plaintiff respondent. Placing reliance on the provisions of section 13(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the principles adopted by the apex Court in the decisions (Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand & Ors.) and (State of Punjab v. Gurnam Singh), the learned counsel for the appellant made a forceful argument that the Court is to consider whether partial eviction will satisfy the claim of the landlord or not and whether partial eviction can substantially satisfy his claim. The learned counsel also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court reported in 1993 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 439 (Krishna Murart Prasad v. Mttar Singh) in support of the contention that even in a fit and proper case, the Court was pleased to divide one shop room into two for satisfying the need of the landlord and to save the tenant from eviction. Actually the learned counsel for the appellant, placing the observation of the apex Court in (Jivram Ranchhoddas Thakkar v. Tulshiram Ratanchand Mantri), argued that the stress should be on 'live and let live' and in proper case, the tenant, if agreed upon, shall surrender half of his tenancy.

Even if the defendant is agreeable to remain in one room that will not be feasible as there is no separate bathroom ad the landlord cannot be asked to share the bathroom with the tenant. The learned counsel for the respondent on this score rightly placed his reliance on a single Bench decision of this Court reported in 1989 (1) CLJ 131 (Peary Afohan Kapoor v. Sudhindranath Saha and anr.) in which the Court disallowed Ihe proposal of sharing of the same bathroom and privy by two families and came to a finding that partial eviction in such a case should be avoided. Reliance was also rightly placed in another decision qf the Apex Court (Sorfa Ahuja v. Indian Insurance Company Limited) in which it was viewed that tenant cannot dictate how the landlord will use the tenanted premises to meet his requirement. Keeping in view the accommodation available in the tenanted premises, it is concluded that partial eviction of the tenant is not possible.

20. Of course, there is no necessity of examining the question of partial eviction specially when the concurrent finding of bolh the Courts below, as is discussed hereinabove, is that the plaintiff urgently requires six rooms including the three rooms available in the suit premises. From the materials on record, I am convinced that the Courts below granted the decree in favour of the plaintiff after due consideration of the relevant criteria for eviction of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal requirement. From the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court had no occasion to consider whether a decree for partial eviction would serve the purpose of the plaintiff as it took a view that the plaintiff was in need of more than six rooms, Including the three rooms in the suit premises. The first appellate Court however discussed the question of partial eviction. But as is discussed hereinabove, it did not take into consideration that actually the plaintiff proved his urgent need in respect of six rooms Including a dining room. Actually the first appellate Court could not give a decree for partial eviction in view of the urgent need of the plaintiff in respect of six rooms, Including the three rooms in the suit premises. I have already taken a view that granting of a decree for partial eviction is not possible in a case of this nature specifically keeping in view the need of the plaintiff. The substantial question of law as formulated is accordingly decided.