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(b) Nothing in sub-clause (a) shall derogate from the powers of Parliament under this Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union territory or any part thereof."

11. By virtue of the said Article 239AA(3)(a) of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi derives power to make laws for the NCT of Delhi with respect to any matters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List, insofar as any such matter is applicable to the Union territories, except matters with respect to Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List insofar as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2 and 18. This is the specific legislative power given to the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi. In other words the constitution has made special provisions to empower the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi to make laws on the specified subjects. Had these special provisions not been there in Article 239AA, there would have been no Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi and it would have been only Parliament which would have had the power and competence to make laws for the Union Territory of Delhi. Therefore, the fountainhead or source of the power and competence of the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi is to be found in Article 239AA and it is that provision which has to be examined to determine as to whether the Amendment Act of 2003 was within the competence of the said Legislative Assembly. The whole issue of Union taxation and State taxation is neither germane nor relevant while determining the competency of the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi in enacting the Amendment Act of 2003. If the said Legislative Assembly had the competence in the backdrop of the provisions of Article 239AA, the fact that the property tax levied was Union taxation is of no consequence. Thus, the submission of the petitioners that, because the property tax regime under the said Act of 1957 was part of Union taxation, the Legislative Assembly did not have the power or competence to introduce a different tax regime by virtue of the Amendment Act of 2003, is untenable.

II. Presidential assent

16. The petitioners have also challenged the Amendment Act of 2003 by submitting that it was repugnant to the said Act of 1957 and that, therefore, by virtue of sub-clause (c) of clause (3) of Article 239AA of the Constitution, the Amendment Act of 2003 was void. The argument is that the said Act of 1957 was sought to be amended by the said Amendment Act of 2003 and, therefore, the latter Act was repugnant to the former to the extent of the amendments sought to be introduced. Furthermore, since the amending act was passed by the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi and the Act sought to be amended had been enacted by Parliament, according to the petitioners, the same (ie., the Amendment Act of 2003) was void in view of the provisions of Article 239AA(3)(c) of the Constitution. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioners, that the first proviso to the said Article 239AA(3)(c) ought not to be interpreted in such a way so as to nullify the provision to which it is a proviso. It was also contended that in any event the court should examine whether the ingredients and conditions precedent for invoking the said proviso had been satisfied in this case. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed primary reliance on Kaiser-i-Hind Pvt. Ltd v. National Textile Corporation Ltd:(2002) 8 SCC 182.

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.

(emphasis supplied)

20. There is one distinction, however, which we must not forget. While State legislatures have exclusivity over entries in the State List (List II), there is no exclusivity insofar as the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi is concerned. In fact, had it not been for the special provision of Article 239AA(3)(a), the Legislative Assembly would not have had any power to legislate at all. Since, NCT of Delhi is not a State and is yet a Union Territory, it would have been Parliament and Parliament alone which could have made laws in respect of Delhi. This is so because of clause (4) of Article 246 which states that Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for "any part of the territory of India not included in a State" notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. Thus, in a sense, the entire domain of legislation granted to the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi by virtue of Article 239AA(3)(a) is a sort of concurrent list in respect of which both Parliament and the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi can legislate. But, this is not in derogation of the powers of Parliament under the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union territory (which includes the NCT of Delhi) or any part thereof. Since, both Parliament and the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi can legislate on certain subjects there is every possibility of there being some repugnancy between the two laws. Consequently, it has been clarified by virtue of Article 239AA(3)(c) that the law made by Parliament shall prevail and the law made by the Legislative Assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. But, as in the case of repugnancy between State law and law made by Parliament, an exception has been carved out in the shape of the first proviso to Article 239AA(3)(c).

29. We fail to see how this decision comes to the aid of the petitioners. In fact, this decision makes it clear that the golden rule with regard to interpreting a proviso is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such a manner that they mutually throw light on each other, resulting in a harmonious construction. Read in this manner it cannot be said that the first proviso obliterates the provisions of Article 239AA(3)(c). On the contrary, when read a whole, the harmonised construction of Article 239AA(3)(c) leads to the understanding that a law made by the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi if repugnant to a provision of law earlier made by Parliament would be void to the extent of the repugnancy unless it can be shown that the law made by the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received the assent of the President in the manner indicated above. We have seen that, as a matter of fact, the Amendment Act of 2003 had received the assent of the President and that the ingredients necessary for triggering the first proviso into action had been satisfied. The obvious conclusion is that a combined reading of the first proviso and Article 239AA(3)(c) leads to the end-result that the Amendment Act of 2003 and the amendments introduced by it would prevail in the NCT of Delhi.