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19. It was, accordingly, strenuously contended before us for the defendant that the Parsis in Bombay are governed by the law of England, and that we should apply to them the English law of slander simpliciter. On the other hand, it was contended by the plaintiff that we were not bound by English law but could decide the matter as we thought fit, and that we should, accordingly, adopt the same practice as in the mofussil where suits for slander have been held to lie without proof of special damage. For that purpose Kashiram Krishna v. Bhadu Bapuji (1870) 7 B. H. C. R (A. C.J.), 17 ; Parvathi v. Mannar (1884) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 175 ; Ibin Hosein v. Haidar (1885) I.L.R. 12 Cal, 109; Trailokya Nath Ghose v. Chundra Nath Dutt (1885) I.L.R. 12 Gal. 424; and Sukkan Teli v. Bipad Teli (1906) I.L.R. 34 Cal, 48 were cited. But these were all cases depending not on the Charter of 1823 which governed proceedings in the King's Court, but on Regulation IV of 1827, Clause 26 (or the corresponding Regulations in other provinces), which governed proceedings in the Courts of the East India Company. Further, counsel for the plaintiff was not prepared to say that we should abrogate the English rule about special damage altogether, but only in the case of the slander of women. In this respect a reference was made to Article 25 of the Limitation Act which provides that in suits for compensation for slander, the period of limitation is one year from the date "when the words are spoken or if the words are not actionable in themselves, when the special damage complained . of results " The defendant seems to me right in saying that this Article contemplates that the English rule as to special damage applies to India. On the other hand, the section does not say which are the cases in which special damage must be proved, and which not, and, accordingly, the precise point before us is left open.