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Showing contexts for: badli worker in Ranbir Singh vs S.K. Roy, Chairman, Life Insurance ... on 27 April, 2022Matching Fragments
There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents that the benefit of Award should be made available to those who have been engaged as Badli workers after 4.3.1991. That is a matter for interpretation by this Court. For the time being, CGIT, New Delhi would limit its enquiry only to the claims of the Badli workers between 20.05.1989 and 04.03.1991, as already indicated by this Court in the order dated 11.05.2018.
We do not find that it is a case of contempt. Therefore, the contempt notices are discharged. However, the applications/petitions be kept pending for the purpose of necessary assistance to the Court.” PART A On 10 September 2018 26, the above order was modified by the same two-judge Bench in the following terms:
“There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents that the benefit of Award should be made available to those who have been engaged as Badli/Part-time/Temporary workers after 4.3.1991. That is a matter for interpretation by this Court. For the time being, CGIT, New Delhi would limit its enquiry only to the claims of the Badli workers between
Consequently, there is no warrant for restricting the operation of the award to the period up to 4 March 1991 (which was the date of reference). The benefit of the award must enure not only to the workers who were engaged as temporaries or badlis after 20 May 1985 till the date of reference but the same principle must also apply to workers who have been engaged thereafter; and PART G
(xiii) The judgment of this Court has directed the payment of fifty per cent back- wages. For the period after the date of the Srivastav Award, full back-wages should be granted to those who have been absorbed. Back-wages cannot be granted only for the period of 70/85 days, and at the rates which were made applicable to the badli workers.
54 That having been said, it is necessary to also advert to the interpretation which was placed on the decisions of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and G Sudhakar (supra). The two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) opined that the scheme which was framed in E Prabavathy PART H (supra) was the outcome of an order which was passed in writ petitions filed by the workers and not in the course of the adjudication of an industrial dispute. On this ground, the Court held that the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) would not come in the way of an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while deciding a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act. The background of the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) has already been noticed earlier. The decision was rendered on 23 October 1992 in a batch of civil appeals which was being considered by a three-judge Bench. During the pendency of the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC to formulate a scheme for the regularisation of workers who had been granted ad hoc employment for at least 85 days from time to time. The three-judge Bench held, after assessing the terms of the scheme proposed by LIC, that it was reasonable and commended itself for acceptance. The scheme proposed by LIC was approved by this Court with a specific observation that the clauses of the scheme extracted in the order would form a part of the order of this Court. The decision of three Judges in E Prabavathy (supra) was thereafter interpreted by a two-judge Bench in its order dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra). Noticing that the scheme which has been accepted in E Prabavathy (supra) governed workers of the Tamil Nadu Division of LIC, the Court held that the scheme would be equally applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC in the country. The Court therefore held that it was not necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a different group of workers, in that case under the directions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. As a matter of fact, it is also material to note that in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award itself there was a specific finding that though the E Prabavathy group of workers had been impleaded in the reference PART H and had filed a statement of the claim, having regard to the fact that the order of this Court dated 23 October 1992 was between the same parties, the workers had no valid ground to challenge the legality of this Court’s order before the tribunal. Despite the clear observations in the Srivastav Award, the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) has come to the conclusion that the order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) would not preclude an industrial adjudication by the tribunal. The two-judge Bench which delivered the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) was bound by the order in E Prabavathy (supra), which was of a larger Bench of three judges, and the interpretation which was placed on it by another two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar (supra). If the two-judge Bench differed, it had to refer the matter to a larger Bench but it was not at liberty to take a final view at variance with binding decisions of a larger Bench and of a co-ordinate Bench. 55 A plea has been urged on behalf of the workers that the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) has attained finality following the dismissal of the review petition on 9 August 2016 (save for the modification by which the quantum of back-wages was reduced to fifty per cent) and the subsequent dismissal of a curative petition. We are cognizant that the ground, submitting that the decision ignored the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), was specifically pleaded in review. The only observation in the judgment in review is that LIC has not submitted anything on record to indicate that the judgment PART H suffers from an error apparent in law. However, having regard to the immense financial burden, the quantum of back-wages would be reduced to fifty per cent. 56 Now, there cannot be any dispute over the principle that the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), followed by the order in review dated 9 August 2016, are between the present parties and finality has attached to them. LIC is, however, before this Court urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwide presence, it is faced with a situation involving conflicting directions of this Court. LIC has submitted that while on the one hand, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were substituted by the terms of compromise on 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), this was preceded by the order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) which accepted the scheme of absorption proposed by LIC and followed by the order dated 28 November 2001 of a two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar (supra) which interpreted the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) as being applicable to all divisions of LIC. The impact of the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) is to substitute and supplant the schemes which were evolved before this Court for providing absorption on specified terms. The essence of the schemes which were accepted by this Court was that those temporary, badli and part-time workers who fulfilled the requirement of the threshold period of service would be eligible to be considered for the grant of the permanency, subject to certain conditions. The orders passed by this Court envisage that these workers would be considered for the grant of permanency in the course of a recruitment process. The impact of the judgment of the two-judge Bench PART H in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) is that while on the one hand the Court’s orders dated 23 October 1992, 7 February 1996 and 22 November 2001 continued to hold the field, on the other hand the restoration of the Srivastav Award brings in place a regime in conflict with what has been accepted by this Court in these orders. Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court to step in and to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused by the decision in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) which has been urged to be per incuriam. The consequence of not doing so is serious. 57 The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of the workers that the principle which has been enunciated in the Srivastav Award and which has been restored by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) must apply to all workers subsequently engaged by applying Section 18(3)(d) read with Section 17A of the ID Act. Hence, a balance will now have to be drawn by this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, which while on the one hand factors in the finality which has attached to the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) but on the other hand also factors in the essential concerns which have been expressed before this Court by LIC. The formula of providing absorption to part-time, badli or temporary workers who have put in 85 days in any two calendar years in a Class III post or 70 days in any three calendar years in a Class IV post will, unless a balance were to be drawn, become an avenue for disregarding the need for an open and transparent process of recruitment by a public sector corporation governed by the PART I rule of law and the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The judgments of this Court, in the context of public employment, lay stress on providing equality of opportunity. As we have recorded earlier in the course of the statements of facts, LIC had been restrained, due to the interim orders which were passed in the course of the various proceedings, from taking recourse to recruitment through the open market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders from pursuing an open recruitment process, the situation which has now arisen is that unless a balance were to be drawn, absorption of part-time and badli workers would become a substitute for a recruitment process based on sanctioned posts, consistent with the principles of reservation and pursued on the basis of a structured recruitment which gives equal opportunities to all applicants. Such a consequence is a serious detriment to constitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a public employer to follow a process which is fair and in consonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An open and competitive process for recruitment will enable LIC to recruit the best among the available talent. Substituting this by a back-door entry will be detrimental to the interests of the corporation which is governed by statute. I Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report 58 Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of LIC, assailed the Dogra Report on the ground that the remit before the CGIT was only to verify and not to adjudicate. There is no doubt about the premise that the task which was PART I entrusted to CGIT by the order of this Court dated 7 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) was of verification. But it becomes necessary to consider whether the remit to the CGIT was only confined to the certified list of workers in the industrial reference. It is true that by the order of this Court dated 10 September 2018, the CGIT was directed to verify the list on the record. However, an isolated sentence in the order of this Court cannot be read torn from its context. Paragraph 94 of the Srivastav Award required LIC to also consider the case of those workers who belonged to the temporary, badli and part-time category, who had completed the qualified period of working and were suitable in every respect but whose services had been terminated. LIC was directed to publish a notice in the daily newspapers so as to enable such workers to lodge their claims for absorption. LIC issued a public notice in the newspapers on 21 July 2015. Each applicant was required to submit a form for being considered for absorption, of which item 10(b) required a disclosure of the details of the petition before the CGIT including whether the applicant was a petitioner in the industrial reference. The crucial aspect, however, is that the verification which was carried out by the CGIT was not specifically restricted to the certified list of workers. The judgment of this Court in the course of the proceedings in review, records the following submissions being made on behalf of LIC: