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“24. To my mind, answer to this question has to be given in the light of backdrop of the circumstances which culminated into passing of the Award in ID case No.27 of 1991 which was admittedly upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment dated 18/3/2015 reported as (2015) 9 SCC 62 – Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India. No doubt, PART B Hon’ble Apex Court in its order dated 10/9/2018 has observed that this Tribunal will verify the list which is available on record. But this does not mean that only such workmen whose names are mentioned in the original/certified list attached with the reference, are liable to be considered for absorption, to the exclusion of other workmen. This Tribunal has to keep in mind that contempt petitions were earlier filed by members of Various Unions before Hon’ble Supreme Court and LIC had also filed contempt petitions in High Court of Delhi against Regional Labour Commissioner. During pendency of said petition, E. Prabhavati and others were impleaded as party at the instance of LIC vide order dated 25/9/2008. Thereafter, memo of parties was filed by LIC by adding Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Welfare Association as Respondent No.47. In view of this, the contention of the LIC that members of E. Prabhavati & others or Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Welfare Association are not entitled to any relief, is not tenable, when the said Association has been held to be necessary party. There is not even a whisper in any of the judgment/order of Hon’ble High Court or Hon’ble Supreme Court that only workmen whose names are mentioned in the certified/original list of CGIT Award are to be granted relief. An overall examination of the order dated 10/9/2018 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court shows that this Tribunal is required to verify the list available on record but there is no direction to exclude members of other Union/workmen inasmuch as Hon’ble the Apex Court while considering the claims of contempt petitioners has ordered this Tribunal to consider the claims of those workers who were employed as Badli workers with the Management of LIC during the period from 20/5/1985 to 4/3/1991 subject to fulfilment of number of days as mentioned in the Award.
“29) During the course of arguments as well as in the reply filed on behalf of the Management/LIC, it is clear that Management has admitted that till date 321 Nos. of employees were found to be eligible in terms of the Award and they were considered eligible for absorption. It is not understandable to this Tribunal as to what were the basis for the Management/LIC for coming to the conclusion that only 321 Nos. of workmen/employees were found to be eligible and covered by the Award of CGIT in ID case No.27/1991, when the Management has come up with a plea that record relating to the workmen being old record is not traceable. It is worthwhile to mention here that Section 25-D of the ID Act specifically provides that it is the duty of every Employer to maintain a muster roll and to provide for the making of entries therein by the workmen who may present themselves for work at the establishment. This Tribunal has to keep in mind a vital fact that since the reference bearing ID No.27/1991 is pending before various Courts since 1991, the Management/LIC was/is required to keep the record in safe custody when the case of such a huge magnitude was PART B pending before the Courts. In such circumstances, this Tribunal is constrained to draw adverse inference against the management.” 23 Based on the above hypothesis, the report proceeded to decide “prima facie” the claims of the Unions and individual workers. While taking up the claims made by the All India Life Insurance Employees Association and its affiliate, Life Insurance Employees Association, Delhi, the report notes that 6998 claims had been filed (as contained in Annexure A). Upon scrutiny, LIC drew the attention of the CGIT to the fact that 3592 duplicate entries were found in the claims which were submitted (as contained in Annexure A-1). Noting that the “Unions have not seriously disputed the same”, the Dogra Report concludes that “such claimants are to be given benefit of absorption only once”. The Dogra Report also notes that workers who had started working beyond the cut-off date of 4 March 1991 would not be covered in the enquiry. This observation in the Dogra Report was in view of the order of this Court in the contempt proceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) on 7 September 2018, which had specifically observed that whether the benefit of the Srivastav Award should be given to those who had been engaged as badli workers after 4 March 1991 was a matter for interpretation by this Court. Hence, for the time being, CGIT had been directed to limit its enquiry only to the claims for the period between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991 (as contained in Annexure A-2). In this context, the Dogra Report held that those workers who had commenced work after 4 March 1991 would not be covered by its enquiry.

(c) No case in contempt had been established;

(vii) The above position is further clarified by this Court’s order dated 10 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising out the review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), in terms of which CGIT was directed to verify the list which was available on its record. Thus, the CGIT was required to scrutinise the applications claiming the benefit of the award against the list of workers who were before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award. Hence, LIC scrutinized the claims of only those who were part of the certified list before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award and had worked between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991;

“41. The award of Justice R.D. Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 reiterated by way of clarification in the award passed by Justice Jamdar dated 26-8-1988, in the dispute subsequently has been operative even after the compromise arrived at between the parties to the compromise in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1-3-1989 (SC)] before this Court. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation that the said awards are not in operation and that only the terms and conditions of compromise and orders of this Court are binding upon the workmen concerned in these appeals is both not factually and legally correct. This abovesaid argument of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation is not tenable in view of the categorical statement made by this Court in its orders passed in SLP referred to supra, wherein, this Court has permitted the management and members of the said 8 unions to implement the terms of compromise by way of interim measure without any prejudice to the rights and contentions of the members of other union who have not entered into compromise with the management of the Corporation. It is not the case of the Corporation in these appeals either before CGIT or before the High Court or in these proceedings the workmen concerned have also accepted the said terms and conditions of the compromise arrived at between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988. This Court in the order passed in the abovesaid SLP which is PART H extracted hereinabove has made it very clear that the said compromise was entered into between unions therein, but it does not prejudice the rights and contentions of the workmen concerned whose disputes are in relation to their absorption in their respective posts who were appointed after 20-5-1985. Further, even if some of the workmen are bound under the said compromise that arose out of SLP No. 14906 of 1988, this in no way deters their right to raise an industrial dispute and get the same adjudicated vide order of reference by the appropriate Government to CGIT. The award of CGIT was concluded after rightly examining the facts, circumstances of the case and the legal principles laid down in the awards passed by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. More importantly CGIT award was passed after rightly appreciating the points of dispute referred to it and on the merits of the case.” The interpretation of the interim order which has been placed by the Court emerges from the following extract: