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5. There is another reason for this view. It has been well-settled by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in G. S. Ramaswamy v. I.G. of Police, Mysore , that a probationer cannot, after the expiry of the probationary period, automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless of course the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. Therefore, even though a probationer may have continued to act on the post to which he was appointed by probation for more than the initial period of probation, he cannot become a permanent servant merely because of the efflux of time, unless the Rules of service which govern him specifically lay down that he will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over. In that case their Lordships made a reference to Rule 486 which provided for confirmation at the end of the probationary period if the employee had given satisfaction, and laid it down that such a rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation as "the condition of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted officer can be confirmed" and that such a condition obviously means that "the authority competent to confirm him must pass an order to the effect that the probationary officer has given satisfaction and is, therefore, confirmed." Reference in this connection may also be made to their Lordships' decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan , where also they have taken the view that the employee does not cease to be a probationer after the expiry of the probationary period and that, without a specific order of confirmation, he continues as a probationer only and acquires no substantive right to the post. A similar view has been taken in a later decision of their Lordships in Kedar Nath v. State of Punjab .

6. I have, therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the petitioner continued to be on probation even after the expiry of the probationary period of two years mentioned in paragraph 3 of document No. 1 because there was no provision for automatic confirmation, and that there is no reason why the provisions of Regulations 29 and 30 should not have been applicable to him as a probationer.

7. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this could not be so and that the Regulations could not govern the petitioner's case as he had been appointed before they came into force. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions in Jyottrmoyee Sharma v. Union of India ; State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh and State of Haryana v. Rajendra Sareen 1972-I L.L.J. 205, The argument is, however, untenable in view of the clear provisions of paragraph 6 of document No. 1, to which reference has been made above. I have gone through Jyotirmoyee Sharma v. Union of India case but that decision was taken before the law on the point was laid down in the aforesaid decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (supra) was a different case for there the service rule fixed a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period could not be extended. State of Haryana v. Rajendra Sareen (supra) was also a different case for there the requirement of the rule was quite different.

8. The fact, therefore, remains that Regulation 29 and 30 became applicable to the petitioner's employment as the "other conditions" of his service. Regulation 30 expressly provided that a probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of the period of his probation, if, inter alia, the Board was satisfied that he was fit for confirmation. It was, therefore, the requirement of the Regulation that an order of confirmation should have been passed by the Board, after examining the question whether the petitioner was fit for confirmation, and this also goes to show that the contention of the petitioner's learned Counsel that the petitioner was automatically confirmed after the expiry of the period of two years' probation is quite untenable. There was, therefore, no change in the petitioner's status and he continued to be on probation after the expiry of the period of two years specified in paragraph 3 of document No. 1.

It, therefore, empowered the Board to extend theperiod of probation upto one year, and as there was no condition regarding extension of the probationary period in the petitioner's order of appointment (document No. 1), the condition regarding extension of the period) of probation stated in Regulation 29 became applicable as a condition of his service by virtue of paragraph 6,

10. Mr. Bhargava tried to get out of this conclusion by arguing that as the function of a proviso is to qualify or create an exception to what is contained in the preceding portion of the enactment, the proviso to Regulation 29 could not be interpreted as authorising the extension of the period of probation after its expiry. He has made a reference to "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by G. P. Singh, page 105, Commr. of Income-tax, Mysore v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. ; Shah Bhoiraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha , and to Craies on Statute Law 7th edition page 218, in regard to the scope and function of a proviso. This is, however, futile because there is nothing in Regulation 29 to require that the initial period of probation must be extended before its expiry. It has to be appreciated that, as has been shown, the terms and conditions of the petitioner's appointment, and the Regulations applicable to him, were such that there could be no automatic confirmation after the expiry of the two years' period of probation, and as the petitioner continue to be on probation when the Board passed its order (document No. 4) dated May 25, 1972 extending his period of probation by one year, it could not be said to matter if that order was made after the expiry of the initial period of probation. I am fortified in this view by the decision in State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1089, where it has been held that the employee continues to be on probation even if the period of probation has expired and has not been extended by any order.