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1. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Engineer in the service of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, respondent No. 1, hereinafter referred to as "the Board", by order document No. 1 dated September 17. 1969. It was a probationary appointment. He joined service on September 27, 1969 and was posted as Assistant Engineer after some training. He has stated that he received a letter dated July 28, 1971 from the Chief Engineer in regard to certain complaints against him, and that he sent a reply stating that the complaints were false and frivolous. The period of his two years' probation expired on September 26, 1971. The Chief Engineer, according to the petitioner, asked him certain questions, which were replied by him, and he was placed under suspension by an order dated October 4, 1971 of the Chief Engineer. He made a representation to the Chairman of the Board on May 6, 1972, praying for reinstatement. The Board thereafter passed an order (document No. 4) dated May 25, 1972 extending the period of his probation by one year, with effect from September 27, 1971, under Regulation 29 of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (recruitment, promotion and seniority, etc.). Regulations, 1969, hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations". This was followed by order dated June 1, 1972 by which he was reinstated in service. He, therefore, took over charge of the office of Assistant Engineer (construction) at Bharatpur, on June 5, 1972. Ultimately order (document No. 5) dated September 25, 1972 was passed by the Board terminating his services on the ground that his work had been found "unsatisfactory during the probationary period". The petitioner has challenged that order on a number of grounds, and I shall refer to those arguments which have been urged by his learned Counsel for my consideration.

5. There is another reason for this view. It has been well-settled by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in G. S. Ramaswamy v. I.G. of Police, Mysore , that a probationer cannot, after the expiry of the probationary period, automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless of course the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. Therefore, even though a probationer may have continued to act on the post to which he was appointed by probation for more than the initial period of probation, he cannot become a permanent servant merely because of the efflux of time, unless the Rules of service which govern him specifically lay down that he will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over. In that case their Lordships made a reference to Rule 486 which provided for confirmation at the end of the probationary period if the employee had given satisfaction, and laid it down that such a rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation as "the condition of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted officer can be confirmed" and that such a condition obviously means that "the authority competent to confirm him must pass an order to the effect that the probationary officer has given satisfaction and is, therefore, confirmed." Reference in this connection may also be made to their Lordships' decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan , where also they have taken the view that the employee does not cease to be a probationer after the expiry of the probationary period and that, without a specific order of confirmation, he continues as a probationer only and acquires no substantive right to the post. A similar view has been taken in a later decision of their Lordships in Kedar Nath v. State of Punjab .

6. I have, therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the petitioner continued to be on probation even after the expiry of the probationary period of two years mentioned in paragraph 3 of document No. 1 because there was no provision for automatic confirmation, and that there is no reason why the provisions of Regulations 29 and 30 should not have been applicable to him as a probationer.

7. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this could not be so and that the Regulations could not govern the petitioner's case as he had been appointed before they came into force. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions in Jyottrmoyee Sharma v. Union of India ; State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh and State of Haryana v. Rajendra Sareen 1972-I L.L.J. 205, The argument is, however, untenable in view of the clear provisions of paragraph 6 of document No. 1, to which reference has been made above. I have gone through Jyotirmoyee Sharma v. Union of India case but that decision was taken before the law on the point was laid down in the aforesaid decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (supra) was a different case for there the service rule fixed a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period could not be extended. State of Haryana v. Rajendra Sareen (supra) was also a different case for there the requirement of the rule was quite different.

11. It has, however, been further argued that as the initial period of probation expired on September 26, 1971, the Board committed an illegality in extending it by its order (document No. 4) dated May 25, 1972, with retrospective effect from September 27, 1971. This argument is also futile because, as has been stated, the petitioner continued to be on probation even after the expiry of the two years period of probation on September 26, 1971, and, in the absence of any order of confirmation under Regulation 30, he did not become a permanent employee of the Board. In fact even though the period of his probation was initially stated to be two years in paragraph 3 of document No. 1, the maximum period of probation was increased to three years by virtue of Regulation No. 29 which became applicable to him in accordance with paragraph 6 of the order of his appointment. The maximum period of three years was thus to expire on September 26, 1972, and there is nothing wrong if the Board passed the order (document No. 4) dated May 25, 1972 extending the period of probation by one year well before the expiry of the period of three years. I do not find it possible to take the view that the Board's aforesaid order of May 25, 1972 did not have the effect of extending the "petitioner's probationary period until September 26, 1972. The mere fact that the Board staled in its order that it had extended the period of probation with effect from September 27, 1971, could not detract from the validity of the order in its application to the petitioner's employment on and from the date when it was passed,