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5. Explaining his above submissions. Mr. Yadav points out that the provisions for granting temporary injunction are embodied under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and if the defendant-respondent was not entitled to an order of injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, the recourse could not have been taken to Section 151 of the Code for the purpose of granting temporary injunction, for, contends Mr. Yadav, the inherent powers could have been exercised, had there been no provision made in the Code for granting of temporary injunction. Since the provisions for granting of temporary injunction have been made, reiterates Mr. Yadav, in Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, it is impermissible to take recourse to Section 151 of the Code for the purpose of granting temporary injunction. Support for this submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Yadav from Ramkarandas Radhavallabh v. Bhagawandas Dwarkadas AIR 1985 SC 1144, Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese , Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Abdul Rahim B. Attar v. Atul Ambalal Barot .

23. The decision rendered in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing, AIR 2003 SC 2434 (supra) makes it abundantly clear that granting or not granting of injunction does not finally dispose of the suit or the proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. Had an injunction application made under Order XXIX Rules 1 and 2 been a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141, granting of temporary injunction and/or refusal to grant temporary injunction could have been taken to have disposed of the proceeding within the meaning of Section 141 and revision against such an order would have, then, been maintainable. However, since an application for temporary injunction, though registered as a miscellaneous proceeding, does not really give rise to a proceeding, which is either original or not dependent on the survival of the suit or the appeal, it cannot be regarded and is, in fact, not regarded as a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. Thus, granting of temporary injunction or refusing to grant temporary injunction and/or affirming temporary injunction by an appellate Court does not end the proceeding; hence, such a temporary order of injunction, in the light of the Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing, AIR 2003 SC 2434 (supra), is not revisable.

31. The question, therefore, which stares at us is this : whether it is Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, which confer Jurisdiction and powers on the Courts of civil jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction ? Since the Orders and the Rules framed thereunder merely prescribe the procedure for exercise of the powers by the Courts, it logically follows that the power to grant temporary injunction lies elsewhere and not in Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2. The question is, as to where lies the power to grant temporary injunction. The answer to this question really lies in Section 94 of the Code, for, the relevant portion of Section 94 reads thus:

33. Since it is merely procedural part of I the Code, which applies to proceeding within the meaning of Section 141, such as, a proceeding for readmission of appeal under Order XLI, Rule 19, the substantive part of the Code, such as, Section 94(C), would not be applicable to the proceedings of a nature. In short, to a proceeding as the one that we have at hand, Section 94(c) would not be applicable.

34. Since Section 94(c) is not applicable to a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141 and since for this reason, even in the circumstances, which satisfy the conditions prescribed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, the Court, which may be in seisin of an application for temporary injunction, cannot grant temporary injunction, can it be held that the Court is powerless to grant temporary injunction in such circumstances ? While considering the momentous question, it is of immense importance to note that temporary injunction can be granted, in the light of the language used in Clause (c) of Section 94, 'in order to prevent ends of Justice from being defeated. It is trite that the purpose of granting temporary injunction is, ordinarily, to restrain the parties from frustrating the suit and also to arrest multiplicity of proceedings taking place. Since the Court remains anxious to ensure that the parties litigating before it do not Involve in such acts of omission or commission, which may lead to multiplicity of proceedings, or which may frustrate the proceeding pending before the Court, imperative it was for the legislature to vest such powers in the Court, which the court can resort to, in order to achieve its predominant goal of stopping 'ends of justice from being defeated', by granting, if necessary, temporary injunction, even in the circumstances, which the legislature has not mentioned or prescribed in Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, for, legislature, while codifying the procedure, may not have envisaged the eventualities, which may crop up either on commencement of the suit or during the progress thereof and/or on termination thereof, which would warrant exercise of powers to grant temporary injunction in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated. It was for such reason that every Court, exercising civil jurisdiction, has been given inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code.