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23. The decision rendered in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing, AIR 2003 SC 2434 (supra) makes it abundantly clear that granting or not granting of injunction does not finally dispose of the suit or the proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. Had an injunction application made under Order XXIX Rules 1 and 2 been a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141, granting of temporary injunction and/or refusal to grant temporary injunction could have been taken to have disposed of the proceeding within the meaning of Section 141 and revision against such an order would have, then, been maintainable. However, since an application for temporary injunction, though registered as a miscellaneous proceeding, does not really give rise to a proceeding, which is either original or not dependent on the survival of the suit or the appeal, it cannot be regarded and is, in fact, not regarded as a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. Thus, granting of temporary injunction or refusing to grant temporary injunction and/or affirming temporary injunction by an appellate Court does not end the proceeding; hence, such a temporary order of injunction, in the light of the Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing, AIR 2003 SC 2434 (supra), is not revisable.

Section 94. Supplemental proceedings. In order to prevent the ends of Justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed -
(a) and (b)...
(c) grant of temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the prison and order that his property be attached and sold.
(d) ...

32. What is, thus, clear from the above discussion is that it is Section 94(c), which vests the civil Courts with the power to grant temporary injunction and also to punish for disobedience of the order of temporary injunction. However, under what circumstances and in what manner, this power can be exercised is actually given in Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2.

33. Since it is merely procedural part of I the Code, which applies to proceeding within the meaning of Section 141, such as, a proceeding for readmission of appeal under Order XLI, Rule 19, the substantive part of the Code, such as, Section 94(C), would not be applicable to the proceedings of a nature. In short, to a proceeding as the one that we have at hand, Section 94(c) would not be applicable.

34. Since Section 94(c) is not applicable to a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141 and since for this reason, even in the circumstances, which satisfy the conditions prescribed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, the Court, which may be in seisin of an application for temporary injunction, cannot grant temporary injunction, can it be held that the Court is powerless to grant temporary injunction in such circumstances ? While considering the momentous question, it is of immense importance to note that temporary injunction can be granted, in the light of the language used in Clause (c) of Section 94, 'in order to prevent ends of Justice from being defeated. It is trite that the purpose of granting temporary injunction is, ordinarily, to restrain the parties from frustrating the suit and also to arrest multiplicity of proceedings taking place. Since the Court remains anxious to ensure that the parties litigating before it do not Involve in such acts of omission or commission, which may lead to multiplicity of proceedings, or which may frustrate the proceeding pending before the Court, imperative it was for the legislature to vest such powers in the Court, which the court can resort to, in order to achieve its predominant goal of stopping 'ends of justice from being defeated', by granting, if necessary, temporary injunction, even in the circumstances, which the legislature has not mentioned or prescribed in Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, for, legislature, while codifying the procedure, may not have envisaged the eventualities, which may crop up either on commencement of the suit or during the progress thereof and/or on termination thereof, which would warrant exercise of powers to grant temporary injunction in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated. It was for such reason that every Court, exercising civil jurisdiction, has been given inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code.

There is difference of opinion between the High Courts on this point. One view is that a Court cannot issue an order of temporary injunction if the circumstances do not fall within the provisions of Order XXXIX of the Code : Varadacharlu v. Narmisha Charlu AIR 1926 Mad 258, Govindarajulu v. Imperial Bank of India AIR 1932 Mad 180, Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami AIR 1933 Mad 500 (2), Murugesa Mudali AIR 1938 Mad 190 and Subramanian v. Seetarama AIR 1949 Mad 104. The other view is that a Court can issue an interim injunction under circumstances which are not covered by Order XXXIX of the Code, if the Court is of opinion, that the interest of justice require the issue of such interim injunction : Dhaneshwar Nath v. Ghanshyam Dhar AIR 1940 All 185, Firm Bichchha Ram v. Firm Baldeo Sahai AIR 1940 All 241, Bhagat Singh v. Jagbir Sawhney AIR 1941 Cal 670 and Chinese Tannery Owners' Association v. Makhan Lal . We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX, Code of Civil Procedure. There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code. It is well-settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the Legislature is Incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression 'if it is so prescribed' is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power.