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3. In the counter filed by the 1st respondent-authority, it is stated that the detenu has been causing grass loot of National Wealth and he was habituated to wilfully destructing the Pristine red sanders by operating mafia and there is a source of potential danger to the public and his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is submitted that the Divisional Forest Officer has placed the record-before the detaining authority on 17-12-2003 wherein it was alleged that on 9-12-2003, a case was registered against the detenu while he was indulging in cutting of red sanders when the forest officials have found the red sander of 15 logs weighing 526 kgs., valued at Rs. 11,072/- and thereby, he committed an offence Under Section 379 IPC read with 20(1)(c)(ii) and (iii) of A.P. Forest Act. Similarly, on 13-12-2003, a case was registered against the detenu while he was found carrying illicit cutting and storage of red sanders for transporting on 13-12-2003. The value of the red sander logs was Rs. 14,432/- and thereby, a case was registered Under Section 379 IPC and Section 20(1)(c)(ii) and (iii) and (iv) of A.P. Forest Act. On 15-12-2003, another case was registered against the detenu under Section 379 IPC and Section 20(1)(c)(ii) and (iii) of A.P. Forest Act.

5. The learned senior counsel Mr. C. Padmanabha Reddy appearing for the detenu has submitted that the detenu did not fall within the definition "Goonda" as defined Under Section 2(g) of the Act and therefore, on this ground alone he is to be released. He further submits that what is contemplated Under Section 2(g) of the Act is that a person who is alleged to have indulged in habitual commission of offences is punishable under Chapter XVI or XVII or XXII IPC. In the instant case, the learned counsel would submit that even though Section 379 IPC is covered by Chapter XVII I.P.C. yet the detaining authority has referred to the provisions Under Section 20 of Forest Act as referred to above and therefore, the detaining authority has taken into consideration the irrelevant material for passing the impugned order. Thus, he submits that there is total non-application of mind and the subjective satisfaction as arrived by the detaining authority is not based on the objective consideration of the material placed on record.

11. The Supreme Court, in the above case, referred to the decisions in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal; and 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 322 in Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police.

12. However, the learned Advocate General relies on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Anakala Maddileti v. Govt. of A.P (D.B.). In that case, the detention order was passed by the detaining authority on 19-02-1999 Under Section 3(2) read with Section 3(1) of the Act. It was alleged in the detention order that the detenu, along with 8 to 10 smugglers, attempted to assault forest personnel and assaulted one Malla Reddy, with sticks. Therefore, a crime was registered Under Section 353,324 and 379 IPC and again on 16-10-1996 when one V. Balachari and his staff were patrolling, the detenu, along with 17 followers, forcibly drove a 14 carts loaded with teak timbers by threatening forest staff and the police registered a case in Cr. No. 106/96 Under Sections 353, 332 and 379 IPC. Further, on 30-10-1996, the detenu along with others obstructed the forest staff on duty and forcibly managed to escape. Therefore, another crime was registered Under Sections 144, 353, 506 and 379 IPC. On 14-12-1999, again, the detenu, along with 20 others attempted to murder the party staff including Ahmad Ali Khan, Forest Range Officer. Therefore, a crime was registered Under Section 332, 307 and 506 IPC. In that regard, when a detention order was passed and it came to be challenged by the detenu, the Division Bench had to consider whether it falls within the definition "Goonda". The Division Bench answered in the affirmative.

14. It is not in dispute that the detaining authority has to apply the principle of objective consideration before reaching subjective satisfaction but when the provision itself cannot be taken into consideration for passing the detention order, can it be said that the detention order can still be maintained?

15. The learned Advocate General however tried to convince this Court that Section 379 IPC is referable to Chapter XVII and that itself constitutes a sufficient ground to enable the detaining authority to pass the order. In our considered opinion, the contention cannot be accepted. When the detaining authority has taken into consideration both relevant and irrelevant grounds, the entire order of detention has to be set aside and it cannot salvage the order to the extent of Section 379 IPC. We are not inclined to go into the aspect whether Section 379 IPC has been properly invoked so as to bring it within the parameters of 2(a) of the Act. Suffice it to say that it is not open for the detaining authority to consider the provisions, which are not relevant and which are not stipulated under the Act so as to invoke the detention order.