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(Lord Halsbury L.C. in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel [1891] A.C. 531, 542).

10. In this case the words themselves declare the intention of the legislature. It therefore appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests of the prosecution or the accused. It would appear that one of the difficulties that has been felt in some of the Courts in India in giving the words their natural construction has been the supposed effect on Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 25 provides that no confession made to a police-officer shall be proved1 against an accused. Section 26No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-officer shall be proved as against such person. Section 27 is a proviso that when any fact is discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence whilst in the custody of a police-officer so much of such information whether it amounts to a confession or not may be proved. It is said that to give Section 162 of the Code the construction contended for would be to repeal Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, for a statement giving rise to a discovery could not then be proved. It is obvious that the two sections can in some circumstances stand together. Section 162 is confined to statements made to a police-officer in course of an investigation. Section 25 covers a confession made to a police-officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of an investigation. Section 27 seems to be intended to be a proviso to Section 26 which includes any statement made by a person whilst in custody of the police and appears to apply to such statements to whomsoever made e.g., to a fellow prisoner, a doctor or a visitor. Such statements are not covered by Section 162. Whether to give to Section 162 the plain meaning of the words is to leave the statement still inadmissible even though a discovery of fact is made such as is contemplated by Section 27 it does not seem necessary to decide. In the present case the declarant was not in the custody of the police, and no alleged discovery was made in consequence of his statement. The words of Section 162 are in their Lordships' view plainly wide enough to exclude any confession made to a police-officer in course of investigation whether a discovery is made or not. They may therefore pro taste repeal the provisions of the section which would otherwise apply. If they do not, presumably it would be on the ground that Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is a "special law" within the meaning of Section 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that Section 162 is not a specific provision to the contrary. Their Lordships express no opinion on this topic for whatever be the right view it is necessary to give to Section 162 the full meaning indicated. It only remains to add that any difficulties to which either the prosecution or the defence may be exposed by the construction now placed on Section 162 can in nearly every case be avoided by securing that statements and confessions are recorded under Section 164. In view of their Lordships' decision that the alleged statement was inadmissible by reason of Section 162, the appellant's contention that it was inadmissible as a confession under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act becomes unnecessary. As the point was argued, however, and as there seems to have been some discussion in the Indian Courts on the matter, it may be useful to state that in their Lordships' view no statement that contains sell exculpatory matter can amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a confession e.g., an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other man's possession. Some confusion appears to have been caused by the definition of confession in article 22 of Stephen's "Digest of the Law of Evidence" which defines a confession as an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. If the surrounding articles are examined, it will be apparent that the learned author after dealing with admissions generally is applying himself to admissions in criminal cases, and for this purpose defines confessions so as to cover all such admissions in order to have a general term for use in the three following articles, confession secured by inducement, made upon oath, made under a promise of secrecy. The definition is not contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 : and in that Act it would not be consistent with the natural use of language to construe confession as a statement by an accused "suggesting the inference that he committed" the crime.