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76. In Dharmender (supra), we took note of several decisions of the Supreme Court. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1952 (3) SCR 377, the Supreme Court observed that the Evidence Act does not prescribe that the statement of the victim/ prosecutrix in the case of rape requires corroboration. A woman, who has been raped, is not an accomplice. She is a victim of an outrage. The rule of corroboration of the statement of the prosecutrix is not a mandatory rule, but a rule of prudence and caution, which could be dispensed with in the facts and circumstances of the given case. All that is required is that it should be present to the mind of the Judge that it is advisable to look for corroboration of the statement of the prosecutrix/ victim. He may dispense with the need for corroboration if he thinks that it is safe to do so. The tender years, coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case, for example, his/ her demeanour, and unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth may render corroboration unnecessary, but that is a question of fact in every case. On the nature and extent of corroboration that the court may look for, the Supreme Court observed that all that is required is that there must be some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the complainant is true, and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it. All that is necessary is that there should be independent evidence which would make it reasonably safe to believe the witness‟ story, that the accused was the one who committed the offence. The corroborative evidence could be circumstantial in nature, and it is not necessary that it has to be direct evidence. The Supreme Court observed, were it otherwise; "many crimes which are usually committed between accomplices in secret, such as incest, offences with females" (or unnatural offences) "could never be brought to justice".