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11. Reference was made to , The Central Bank of India and Ors. v. Their Workmen, etc. The observations in para 12, however, do not support the contention of Shri Modak because the Court observed :

"..... The statement of objects and reasons is not admissible, however, for construing the section; far less can it control the actual words used."

The following passage from Craies of Statute Law, Fifth Edition, pages 56 and 57 were quoted there with approval.

"For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a preamble, and also the word 'declared' as well as the word 'enacted'.

A remedial Act, on the contrary, is not necessarily retrospective; it may be either enlarging or restraining and it takes effect prospectively, unless it has retrospective effect by express terms or necessary intendment."

In that case, the Supreme Court has held that sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 did not purport to explain any former law or declare what the law has always been and it was an ordinary remedial piece of legislation. In order to support his submission that the Act was not declaratory and therefore retrospective, Shri Manohar relied on the observations in M/s. Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Orissa o the effect that the validity of the statutory notification cannot be judged merely on the basis of statements of objects and reasons accompanying the Bill. Nor it could be tested by the Government policy taken from time to time. The executive policy of the Government, of the statement of objects and reasons of the Act or Ordinance cannot control the actual words used in the legislation, while reiterating the statement of the law in this respect in the Central Bank of India and Others v. Their Workmen, etc., , Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Baroda v. R. V. Krishnarao, (1990-I-LLJ-87). We must notice that until the clause (bb) was introduced by the Amending Act of 1984, the interpretation placed on the term 'retrenchment' by the Courts was holding the field for several decades and continues to hold the field in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in 1990 II SVLR (L) 272 which was decided on May 15, 1990, that 'retrenchment' means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section. Once the categories covered by clause (bb) are found to have been excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' until it was inserted by the amending clause (bb) in the face of the judicial interpretation, for several decades, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of express words in the Amending Act or amended provision, that the amendment was only declaratory in nature. Such an inference would not follow even by necessary implication. We are supported in the view that we are taking by a Single Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Arun Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. 1986 LIC 251 and the decision in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Baroda v. R. V. Krishnarao (supra). In the latter, it was observed that such a substantive provision imposing additional restriction on the meaning of the term 'retrenchment' cannot be construed to be retrospective by necessary intendment. It being purely a remedial measure and seeking to displace series of decisions of the Supreme Court on the point must be held to be prospective in nature and will apply to only those terminations which take place after this provision was brought on the statute book. A learned Single Judge of this Court and Ors. v. Zila Parishad, Yavatmal and Others (1990-I-LLJ-445) pointed out that sub-clause (bb) in addition to the three already existing, takes out a class of employment from the definition of 'retrenchment' and that class is where the termination of service is on account of non-renewal of a service contract between the workmen and the employer or where contractual employment comes to an end on the basis of stipulation contained therein. In the learned Judge's view, the exception as contained in sub clause (bb) will have to be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been enjoying earlier to the amendment. We respectfully agree with the view taken in these decisions and we find it impossible to hold that clause (bb) inserted by Act 49 of 1984 is either declaratory in nature or retrospective in its operation. The petitioner's case would therefore fall squarely within the ratio of the decision in Workmen of State Bank of India, Garhchiroli Branch v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2 and Another (supra), we must hold that since the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act were not complied with while discharging the petitioner, the termination came within the meaning of the term 'retrenchment' under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act.