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40. Even on the assumption that there was some negligence on the part of the railway administration in this behalf, could they be made answerable for the loss?

41. It should be remembered here that, but for the action of the mob the goods would not have been lost. The injurious effects are not traceable to the alleged negligence of leaving the property on the platform, but are attributable to the intervening or the over-powering cause viz., the looting of the goods. In other words, the negligent act is not followed by injurious results as a natural and probable consequence, but by the occurrence of something abnormal which could not have been foreseen and guarded against. The proximate cause for the loss is the looting by the violent mob on the 16th morning and not the alleged negligent act which constituted only a remote cause.

Perhaps one may be forgiven for saying that B, snaps the chain of causation; that he is no mere conduit pipe through which consequences flow from A to C, no mere moving part in a transmission gear set in motion by A; that, in a word, he, insulates A from C."

46. If this principle is applied to the instant case, it is clear [hat the railway administration is 'insulated' by the extraordinary occurrence on the 10th morning.

47. The next case which we propose to cite is Memphis Railroad Co. v. Reeves, (1870) 19 Law Ed 909. In that case, the goods were handed over to a Railway Administration for transmission. There was delay in transit which was not satisfactorily explained. The consignment was destroyed by a sudden, violent and extraordinary flood and storm. This led the party who sustained the loss to sue the railway for compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that if the goods were corned in time they would not have been affected by flood the claim was negatived, in the view that the flood was the proximate cause and the delay in transit was only a remote cause. Reference was made to earlier cases also which expressed a similar opinion.

48. This principle was accepted by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in 43 Ind Cas 263 : (MR 1918 Cal 892 (2)) which has already been adverted to. The learned Judges ruled that the railway administration which could not deliver the goods which were entrusted to it for despatch and carriage to Calcutta, as they were lost as a result of a severe cyclone, was not answerable to the loss for the reason that the proximate cause of the loss was an act of God, even if the railway was guilty of negligence in that, there was delay in transmission. The learned Judges extracted with approval a passage from Beven in his work on Negligence (1908) Vol. I, Page 81, to state the law thus: