Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

The question as to what would be the date of award has been set at rest. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and another7 has held that the date of award means date of knowledge of award. Full knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award which may be either actual or constructive.

Relevant paragraph '5' is quoted as under:-

"5. As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this court in Harish Chandra's Case, 1962-1 SCR 676 : (AIR 1961 SC 1500). It was there observed that a literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award" occurring in the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and "the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression...... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents' date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Raja Harish Chandra's case 1962 (1) SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 1500, is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12 (2) of the Act, the party -must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954 that the respondents had knowledge of the award. One of the respondents gave evidence before the learned Subordinate Judge and she said "The application marked as Ex. D-1 was given by me but the amount of compensation was not known to me, nor did I know about acquisition of the land. Chaudhari Mohd. Sadiq, my karinda had told me on the day I filed the said application that the land had been acquired by the Government."