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It is crystal clear from the plain language of the said clause (2) that our Constitution-makers realised the need to set up an independent body or commission which would be permanently in session with atleast one officer, namely, the CEC, and left it to the President to further add to the Commission such number of ECs as he may consider appropriate from time to time. Clause (3) of the said article makes it clear that when the Election Commission is a multi-member body the CEC shall act as its Chairman. What will be his role as a Chairman has not been specifically spell out by the said article and we will deal with this question hereafter. Clause (4) of the said article further provides for the appointment of RCs to assist the Election Commission in the performance of its functions set out in clause (1). This, in brief, is the scheme of Article 324 insofar as the constitution of the Election Commission is concerned.

We may now briefly notice the position of each functionary of the Election Commission. In the first place, clause (2) states that the appointment of the CEC and other ECs shall, subject to any law made in that behalf by Parliament, be made by the President. Thus the President shall be the appointing authority. Clause (5) provides that subject to any law made by Parliament, The conditions of service and the lenure of office of the RCs shall be such as may be determined by rule made by the president. of course the RCs do not form part of the Election Commission but. are appointed merely to help the commission, that is to say, the CEC and the ECs if any. As we have pointed out earlier the lenure, salaries, allowances and other perquisites of the CEC and ECs had been fixed under the Act as equivalent to a Judge of the Supreme Court and the High Court, respectively. This has undergone a change after the ordinance which has so amended the Act as to place them on par. However,the proviso to clause (4) of Article 324 says (i) the CEC shall not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court and (ii) the condition of service of the CEC shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment. These two limitations on the power of Parliament are intended to protect the independence of the CEC from political and/or executive interference. In the case of Ecs as well as Rcs the second proviso to clause(5) provides that they shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of the CEC. It may also be noticed that while under clause (4), before the appointment of the RCs, consultation with the Election Commission (not CEC) is necessary, there is no such requirement in the case of appointments of ECs. The provision that the ECs and the RCs once appointed cannot be removed from office before the expiry of their tenure except on the recommendation of the CEC ensures their independence. The scheme of Article 324 in this behalf is that after insulating the CEC by the first proviso to clause (5), the ECs and the RCs have been assured independence of functioning by providing that they cannot be removed except on the recommendation of the CEC. of course, the recommendation for removal must be based on intelligible, and cogent considerations which would have relation to efficient functioning of the Election Commission. That is so because this privilege has been conferred on the CEC to ensure that the ECs as well as the RCs are not at the mercy of political or executive bosses of the day. It is necessary to relise that this check on the executive's power to remove is built into the second proviso to clause (5) to safeguard the independence of not only these functionaries but the Election Commission as a body. If, therefore, the power were to be exercisable by the CEC as per his whim and caprice, the CEC himself would become an instrument of oppression and would destroy the independence of the ECs and the RCs if they are required to function under the threat of the CEC recommending their removal. It is, therefore, needless to emphasise that the CEC must exercise this power only when there exist valid reasons which are conducive to efficient functioning of the Election Commission. This, briefly stated, indicates the status of the various functionaries constituting the Election Commission.

We have already highlighted the salient features regarding the composition of the Election Commission. We have pointed out the provisions regarding the tenure, conditions of service, salary, allowances, removability, etc., of the CEC the ECs and the RCs. The CEC and the ECs alone constitute the Election Commission whereas the RCs are appointed merely to assist the Commission. The appointment of the RCs can be made after consulting the Election Commission since they are supposed to assist that body in the performance of the functions assigned to it by clause (1) of Article 324. If that be so there can be no doubt that they would rank next to the CEC and the ECs. That brings us to the question regarding the status of the CEC vis-a-vis the ECs. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the CEC enjoyed a status superior to the ECs for the obvious reason that (i) the CEC has been granted conditions of service on par with a Judge of the Supreme Court which was not the case with the conditions of service of ECs before the Ordinance, (ii) the CEC has been given the same protection against removal from service as available to a Judge of the Supreme Court whereas the ECs can be removed on the CEC's recommendation, (iii) the CEC's conditions of service cannot be altered or varied to his disadvantage after his appointment, (iv) the CEC has been conferred the privilege to act as Chairman of the multi-member Commission and (v) the CEC alone is the permanent incumbent whereas the ECs could be removed, as happened in the case of Dhanoa. Strong reliance was placed on the observations in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Dhanoa's case in support of the argument that the CEC enjoys a higher status vis-a-vis the ECs while functioning as the Chairman of the Election Commission. The observations relied upon read thus:

There can be no doubt that the Election Commission discharges a public function. As pointed out earlier, the scheme of Article 324 clearly envisages a multi-member body comprising the CEC and the ECs. The RCs may be appointed to assist the Commission. If that be so the ECs cannot be put on par with the RCs. As already pointed out, ECs form part of the Election Commission unlike the RCs. Their role is, therefore, higher than that of RCs. If they form part of the Commission it stands to reason to hold that they must have a say in decision-making. If the CEC is considered to be a superior in the sense that his word is final, he would render the ECs non-functional or ornamental. Such an intention is difficult to cull out from Article 324 nor can we attribute it to the Constitution-makers. We must reject the argument that the ECs' function is only to tender advise to the CEC.