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6. It appears that although the respondent company was acknowledging the payment to be made to the petitioner on this count, it wanted this payment to be made by HPCL. It may be because of the reason that goods were imported on behalf of HPCL and even the payment which was made to the principals LOC was opened by HPCL. The respondent company, therefore, did not intend to assume the liability to pay this agency commission and was insisting HPCL to make this payment. However, the HPCL was not willing to pay up this commission apprehending that by doing so it would be violating some Government's guidelines as per which payment of such commissions to Indian agents was prohibited. This becomes obvious from letter dated 18th July, 1994 written by the respondent company to HPCL copy of which was marked to the petitioner company.

8. On receiving the notice of this petition, the respondent company filed its reply. A perusal of the reply would show that it has taken following defense while opposing this petition:

(i) Claim of the petitioner is time barred.
(ii) It was never the liability of the respondent company to pay the agency commission. If the petitioner had any such claim, it was against HPCL and not against the respondent company as the respondent company only acted as the agent of HPCL and the petitioner was all along aware of this fact. IN the purchase order also HPCL was shown as consignee of the goods and therefore being beneficiary it was the liability of HPCL. Supplementary affidavit is filed by the respondent company making an attempt to demonstrate that how HPCL was concerned with making the payment and the petitioner was made aware of the same by series of correspondence.

9. In view of the stand taken by the respondent company fastening the liability, if any, with HPCL, the court deemed it proper to issue notice to HPCL. HPCL appeared pursuant to said notice and has filed its reply. A perusal of this reply would show that apart from raising a preliminary objection about the maintainability of such petition; claim being time barred; no liability to pay any such commission as LOC was opened in favor of the principals deleting agency commission; no liability was ever admitted by HPCL for payment for any such commission, it is also stated that there is no privity of contract between HPCL and the petitioner and HPCL never dealt with the petitioner.

21. The respondent company/MMTC has not admitted the jural relationship of debtor and creditor. Although it is admitted that the commission is due, however case of the respondent company here is that this has to be paid by the HPCL. One may at this stage take note of some surrounding circumstances under which this letter was written. This letter is not addressed to the petitioner. It is written to the HPCL by the respondent company. The respondent company is reminding the HPCL to make the payment as the petitioner is demanding the same. No doubt the order was placed upon the petitioner by the respondent company. However, case of the respondent company is that it was placed on behalf of the HPCL. Admittedly, it is the HPCL which had opened LOC and had made payment of goods to the seller in Germany. Therefore, as far as the respondent company is concerned it is maintaining that the agency commission was also to be paid by the HPCL. I may hasten to add at this stage that whether this stand of the respondent company is legally sound or not is not the issue which we are examining here. We cannot drift away from the context. The issue is as to whether letter dated 18th July, 1994 constitutes acknowledgment of debt by the respondent company. The relevant consideration therefore would be to examine as to whether the respondent company is assuming its liability to pay. If it is not admitting this liability, for the purpose of Section 18 of the Limited Act, we cannot determine the justification of such a stand. That enquiry would have been relevant had the issue in hand be as to whether the commission is payable by the respondent company or the HPCL. However, fact remains that in so far as letter dated 18th July, 1994 is concerned, the respondent company has not admitted any liability on its part and has tried to fasten the liability on the HPCL and therefore such a letter cannot be treated as acknowledgment of debt by the respondent company as there is no admission on its part that it owes the debt to the petitioner. In order to constitute an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, it was necessary to establish that the respondent company accepted expressly or impliedly its liability to pay the debt. Learned counsel for the petitioner wanted this court to take into consideration the admissions contained in the said letter as pointed in para 13 and give a finding to the effect that stand of the respondent company denying its liability was not legally tenable and therefore the letter constitutes acknowledgment. Such an exercise would involve a far-fetched process of reasoning which is not permissible as what we read from the letter in question is that statement was made by the respondent company clearly without intending to admit its liability. If one was adjudicating upon the claim of the petitioner on merits in a civil suit and not the issue of limitation , one would have definitely gone into the issue as to whether the attempt on the part of the respondent company to avoid its liability is legally permissible or not. However, that is not the scope of enquiry under Section 19 of the Limitation Act when what is to be examined is a pure simple question as to whether the writer of the letter is acknowledging its debt.