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10. There appears to be some misconception about the legal status of this Tribunal as it appeared from the contention which was raised during the hearing on behalf of the respondent to the effect that the Tribunal not being constituted under Article 323B of the Constitution of India and being creature of the statute, has no power to consider whether the rules are ultra vires the Act. Such doubt is wholly misplaced in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , R.K. Jain v. Union of India and the decision of this Tribunal in Mitra Steel and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Raigad reported in 2005 TIOL 824 CESTAT MUM. The doubt so raised before us is not at all warranted by the provisions of Article 323B inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act 1976, which clearly contemplated constitution of a Tribunal of this nature. It will be noted that Article 323B of the Constitution is not a self executing provision and it merely authorized the appropriate legislature to make laws to set up tribunals to the exclusion of courts. Article 323B(1) enables the Parliament to provide, by legislation, for the adjudication by tribunals, of the matters specified in Clause (2) including "levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax" under Sub-clause (a) thereof. Such law made under Clause (1) may provide for the establishment of hierarchy of tribunals, specify their powers and procedures under Clause (3) of Article 323B. Thus, Article 323B only specifies the Parliament's power to make law for entrusting matters to the tribunal created by law, which would be a tribunal created under a statute like this tribunal which was created under the law, i.e. under Section 129 of the Customs Act with other statutory provisions made thereunder regarding matters entrusted to it to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all courts except the High Court and the Supreme Court. Both Articles 323A and 323B contemplated that such tribunals may be established under a statute which provide for such establishment and did not create them. Section 129 of the Customs Act is a law made under Clause (1) of Article 323B that provided for the establishment of this tribunal by requiring the Central Government to constitute this Appellate Tribunal, as contemplated by Clause (3) of Article 323B, which is similar to Article 323A(2)(a) relating to Administrative Tribunals. The establishment of this Tribunal owes its existence to the law made by the Parliament in the exercise of the powers Page 320 to make law providing for establishment of tribunals as specified in Article 323B(3)(a) read with Article 323B(1) and 2(a) of the Constitution. This leaves no scope for treating this tribunal merely as a department of the executive Government or its adjunct, which departments are created under the rules of business by the executive head. This Appellate Tribunal has clearly an independent statutory existence emanating from the constitutional provisions of Article 323B that specify the power of the Parliament to make law providing for its establishment. Its establishment as an independent statutory creation envisaged by a specific constitutional provision, as distinguished from a mere department of executive government, emphasizes the nature of its purely judicial appellate functions which on important issues are subject only to the appellate powers of the Supreme Court under Section 130E(b) of the Customs Act 1962. The type of doubt raised against its independent statutory existence which is directly relatable to Article 323B, undermines the constitutional effort to establish such tribunals for performing specific judicial functions, as an attribute of exercise of sovereign power that underlies the judicial adjudicatory processes of courts and purely judicial tribunals, like the CESTAT, that are created for achieving such tasks. The institutions contemplated by the Constitution can be enormously damaged from within and without if their nature and purpose of creation are not properly understood. We hold that this Tribunal has the power to consider the validity of the impugned Rule which we have found to be valid and in consonance with the provisions of the Parent Act.