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The office shall take care while issuing the relevant copies to not disclose the identity of the appellant.

2 ‘IPC’, for short.

transfer of the case in relation to the other offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gairsain, District Chamoli.

3. The relevant background aspects and factual matrix of the case are not of much complications, but the operation of law, with regard to territorial jurisdiction for the offence pertaining to Section 376 IPC and segregation of charges, calls for examination in this appeal with reference to the question as to whether the said offence under Section 376 IPC and the other offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?3

Accordingly, the revision lacks merit and dismissed.”

8. The aforesaid orders as passed by the High Court and the Sessions Judge are in challenge in the present appeal. Before adverting to the stand of the respective parties and the rival contentions, another relevant fact could be taken note of at this juncture, which relates to the trial for the aforesaid offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC.

9. As noticed, in the impugned order dated 28.10.2017, the learned Sessions Judge, while discharging the accused-respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 IPC on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, had transferred the matter to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gairsain, District Chamoli for trial of the respondent No. 2 in relation to the remaining offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC. The said matter was taken up for trial by the learned Judicial Magistrate in Criminal Case No. 137 of 2017. In this trial, the appellant and other witnesses were indeed examined by the prosecution and ultimately, the case was decided by the learned Judicial Magistrate by his judgment and order dated 01.05.2019. A perusal of the said judgment and order dated 01.05.2019 makes out that the learned Judicial Magistrate, after appreciation of evidence, found that the prosecution witnesses had failed to establish the fact that the accused-respondent No. 2 hurled abuses or gave death threats to the appellant and her family. The said finding of the learned Judicial Magistrate, leading to acquittal of the accused- respondent No. 2 of the offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, reads as under: -

22.1. A close look at the alleged events/acts bring to fore the basic feature that on 13.11.2015, the appellant and the respondent No. 2 were engaged for matrimonial alliance at their village Dangidhar, Tehsil Gairsain, District Chamoli but, the proposal of marriage did not materialise. However, the alleged acts of sexual relationship took place at Delhi in the months of February and March, 2016. The other alleged acts had been of the respondent No. 2 hurling abuses and extending threats in or around the month of November, 2016, which the appellant received over telephone at her village. The acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either. Significantly, while the appellant had alleged that she submitted to the sexual acts because of the threat by the respondent No.2 to snap the proposed alliance but it had not been her case that the respondent No. 2 attempted to coerce her into the same physical relationship while hurling abuses or threatening to kill at the later part of time. Thus, it is difficult to find continuity of actions and community of purpose or design in two different acts leading to two different set of offences, i.e., one under Section 376 IPC and the other under Sections 504/506 IPC. Putting it differently, so far as the act leading to the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC is concerned, even as per the allegations of the appellant, that particular act was a completed one and the original design of subjecting the appellant to physical relations was accomplished at Delhi in the months of February and March, 2016. As noticed, there is no allegation of such an activity having continued later or having taken place at Chamoli or even any threat having been extended to the appellant to again submit to such an activity. Viewed from this angle too, the completed act concerning one offence (Section 376 IPC) could not have been connected with the other acts leading to other offences. 22.2. From whatever angle we examine the matter, in the given set of facts, it is difficult to sew the alleged acts together so as to form the same transaction. To put it in a simple idiom, the two alleged set of acts, one of sexual exploitation, leading to the offence of rape (Section 376 IPC) and another of hurling abuses and threats, leading to the offences of insult and intimidation (Sections 504/506 IPC), are just like chalk and cheese; they cannot be connected together so as to form the same transaction on the facts of this case.

“461. Irregularities which vitiate proceedings. - If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things, namely: -

       ….          ….     ….
       (l) tries an offender;
       ….          ….     ….
       his proceedings shall be void.”

24.1.1. So far as the offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC are concerned, it cannot be said that the said Judicial Magistrate was not empowered by law to try these offences. Rather, the offence under Section 504 IPC is triable by any Magistrate. In the present case, the alleged threat was to cause death which relates to Part II of Section 506 IPC and is triable by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class. It is not the case that the Magistrate concerned who had tried the matter was in any way lacking in power and authority to try the offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC. The validity and correctness of the order of segregation of the charge under Section 376 IPC is a matter entirely different but until the said order was in operation, the matter had to go to the trial before the said Magistrate and he was bound to proceed with the same. Hence, this contention on behalf of the respondent No. 1-State stands rejected.