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Same principle is discussed in Corpus Juris Secundum as under :

...Where the reference in the adopting statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific statute or part thereof,... the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied, with all the changes made from time to time, at least as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute.

43. On the other hand legislation by incorporation 'is to write those sections into the new Act as if they had been actually written in it with pen or printed in it'. Repeal of the provision of the earlier act adopted or any amendment of alteration in it can have no effect on its operation in the adopting Act as having become part of the new statute it remains untouched by what happens in the parent Act. One of the reasons to resort to such method of legislation is to ensure uniformity. For instance if a statute provides a remedy by way of second appeal on the same grounds as is specified in Section 100 CPC then it may for sake of brevity and uniformity incorporate those provisions as was the case in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. AIR (1979) SC 798, which permitted a second appeal to be filed on, 'one or more of grounds of appeal specified in Section 100 of CPC'. Provisions of Section 100 CPC stood transposed in Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (in brief Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act_'). The legislature instead of reproducing the same words opted for incorporation by reference as such device brings all the learning given to it by the courts of law. Effect of it was that the provision of Section 100 of CPC having become part and parcel of the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act_ it could be amended, altered or repealed by exercising such power under the act and not under CPC. State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan ; Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Bolani Ores. Ltd. v. State of Orissa , were cases in which definitions of other acts which had withstood the test of interpretation were incorporated. In Narsimhan's case meaning of the word 'public servant' used in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code having become well known by interpretative process the State Legislature instead of repealing it adopted it by providing that, for purpose of this Act "public servant" means a public servant defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal code'. When such method of legislation is resorted to (he legislature prefers to accept the interpretation and understanding of such an expression as given by the courts in respect of it in the earlier Act. Legislation by incorporation bring into effect a new and independent legislation which remains unaffected by any change, or alteration or amendment in the earlier Act, 'because the legislature, which adopts by incorporation the existing provisions of another law, cannot be assumed to intend to bind itself to all future amendments or modifications which may be made in the earlier law. In other words, the incorporating Act does nothing more than borrow certain provisions of an existing Act an instead of setting out, verbatim, those provisions in its own creation, refers to them as a matter of convenience in the mode of drafting' Western Coal fields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, Kobra & Anr [1982| 2 SCR 1. Although the decision of Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative insurance Society Ltd was concerned with the L.A. Act adopted by the Calcutta Improvement Act the Court on consideration of the provisions held that the effect of extensive modifications in the local act and schedule was, 'to enact for the purposes of the local Act a special law for the acquisitions of land'. Further the decision turned on the principle that specific excludes general. The Court held that the State act while adopting L.A. Act constituted a tribunal and accorded it, by fiction, status of courts, 'except for the purposes of Section 54 of the Act'. Therefore, in view of this exclusion the subsequent amendment in Section 54 of L.A Act providing for second appeal could not be available in acquisition proceedings under the Act. The language of Section 55 of the Avas Vikas Act permitting acquisition under the provisions of the L.A. Act 1894(Act 1 of 1894), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, with modifications specified in the schedule, is widely different from the language used in Calcutta Improvement Trust Act. Apart from it this Court in Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and Anr. held Section 284N of the Municipal Corporation Act was a referential legislation even though the Section ran as under :