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We note that Coordinate Bench of ITAT Kolkata in the case of ITC Limited Vs ADIT. IT - 2(1), reported in [2017/185 TTJ 145 (Kol-Trib.], on similar facts held that payment made by assessee an Indian company to a Singapore based company for right to use software could not be regarded as royalty, as assessee only had a right to use computer software and did not have right to use copyright in computer software. The important findings of the coordinate bench is given below:

"20. A perusal of the above provisions of the copyright Act reveals that the computer software is included in the definition of literary work and is covered under the purview and scope of copyright. The exclusive rights to do or authorize the doing of certain acts as mentioned in clause (a) and clause (b) of section 14 vests in the owner of the work such as to reproduce the work, to issue copies, to make translation or adaptation, to sell or give on commercial rental in respect of a work. The internal use of the work for the purpose it has been purchased does not constitute right to use the copy right in work. A combined reading of clause-3 and clause-8 of the Agreement dated 15.12.2008 between the appellant and NPL, clearly shows that the Appellant had only a right to use the computer software and did not have right to use copyright in the computer software. In other words none of the rights as is envisaged under Sec.14(a) or (b) of the Copyright Act, 1957 was conveyed by the agreement dated 15.12.2008. Therefore the payment in question made by the Assessee to NPL cannot be regarded as "Royalty". As we have already observed the Act does not specifically include "computer software" in the term "literary work" and under such circumstances, if we apply the provisions of Act to define the scope of "Literary Work", then perhaps the "computer software" will be out of the scope of the term royalty as defined under the DTAA. However, if we apply the Copyright Act, then the "computer software" will have to be included in the term "literary work" but to constitute "royalty" under the DTAA, the consideration should have been paid for the use of or the right to use the copyright in the "literary work" and not the right to use "literary work" itself.