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J U D G M E N T ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

A question of seminal importance relating to the period for which interest in terms of Section 234B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act') can be levied when the Settlement Commission (in short 'the Commission') passes an order under Section 245D of the Act, is the subject matter of adjudication in these appeals. These appeals are directed against the common judgment of the Special Bench of the Commission (in Gulraj Engineering Construction Co. In re and Ors. (1995 (215) ITR ATS 1) which dealt with five situations where such questions may arise. The situations according to the Special Bench are as follows:

In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the revenue submitted that the view expressed by the Special Bench is clearly unsustainable. Chapter XIX-A which was introduced in the Act makes a distinction between income disclosed by the assessee before the Assessing Officer and undisclosed income disclosed in an application filed before the Commission. In the latter situation, the Commission gets jurisdiction if prescribed conditions are fulfilled. When an assessee files a petition under Section 245C, there is a liability to pay the additional tax in respect of the undisclosed income. An exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Commission and its order is conclusive. The expressions 'regular assessment' or 're-assessment' as appearing in Sections 234A, 234B and 234C relate to income which was earlier disclosed before the income-tax authorities. For all practical purposes, the Commission exercises original jurisdiction and the orders passed under Section 245D(4) and consequentially under sub-section (6) are in the nature of original orders determining liability of tax, penalty and interest and quantification thereof. It has to be borne in mind that provisions relating to settlement as appearing in Chapter XIX-A constitute a complete code. Therefore, the view of the Special Bench with reference to regular assessment as defined under Section 2(40), or re-assessment under Section 147 has no relevance. The liability to pay interest under Sections 234A, 234B and 234C, as the case may be, is of mandatory nature as was observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala and Ors. (2001 (252) ITR 1). The starting point of the terminus for payment of interest is not in dispute. It is only the end point. The same has to be the date on which the order is passed by the Commission under Section 245D and not an earlier point of time.

In the present case, the dispute relates to the period for which interest is chargeable under Section 234B. Sections 234A, 234B and 234C relate to three different types of infractions. Under Section 234A, interest is chargeable for default in furnishing a return of income. Levy is attracted when return of income for any assessment year under sub-section (1) or sub- section (4) of Section 139 or in response a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 142 is furnished after the due date or is not furnished. Levy in terms of Section 234B to which the present cases relate, is attracted for defaults in payment of advance tax. The provision reads as follows:

The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber' or 'dead letter' is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.

Even though in Section 245D(4) or in section 245D(6), the terminus points for charging interest have not been specifically provided, they have to be charged in the spirit of Sections 234A, 234B and 234C. The interests charged under Sections 245D(2C) and 245D(6A) are for different types of defaults and are not really relatable to Sections 234A, 234B and 234C.