Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

1. The Head Mistress of the school, run by the applicant society, had challenged her reversion effected by an order dated 1-11-1999, in Regular Civil Suit No. 58/ 1999, before the Civil Judge (Senior) Division, Nanded and her application for interim relief was rejected. She had gone in appeal before the District Court unsuccessfully and filed Civil Revision Application No. 930/1999 which came to be disposed of by this Court with liberty to approach the Schools Tribunal under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short M.E.P.S. Act). The applicant society has filed the instant review application, contending therein that the view taken by this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 930/1999 that civil suit was not tenable before the Civil Court is contrary to the view taken earlier by this Court (Dr. Saraf, J.) in the case of Rasta Peth Education Society, Pune v. Pethkar Udhav Bhimashankar, and therefore, the order passed by this Court is required to be reviewed.

2. This Court in Rasta Peth Education Society's case, after referring to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., . Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, and Rajammkumar Bhargav v. Union of India, , held that there is nothing in the scheme of the M.E.P.S. Act to justify and infer implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and it is open to the suitor to select one of the two fora viz. an appeal under the M.E.P.S. Act or a civil suit before the Civil Court and if the teacher opts for a civil suit, the remedy available under the M.E.P.S. Act, by way of an appeal, will not operate as a bar. This ratio implies that the remedy provided under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act of filing of an appeal, against an order of termination, dismissal or otherwise removal or reduction in rank or supersession will not operate as a bar against filing of a suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging such orders. Referring to the provisions of section 12 of the M.E.P.S. Act, this Court in Rasta Peth Education Society's case held that what is barred under the said section is suit, appeal or otherwise regular proceedings in any Court or tribunal in respect of the matters decided by the tribunal and section 12 does not prohibit suit or other proceedings in any Civil Court in any matter for which appeal has been provided under the said Act.

11. A detail examination of the scheme of the M.E.P.S. Act and the Rules framed thereunder, as has been summarized herein above, would indicate that sufficient provisions have been made to deal with the grievances relating to the service matters of the employees in the private schools, whether aided or unaided, and the remedy so provided is, undoubtedly, efficacious as well as complete. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Shri Panch Nagar (supra) and Dhulabhai (supra) when the provisions of a special statute do not specifically bar maintainability of a suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary to examine the provisions of such special statute to find out whether the jurisdiction of Civil Court is impliedly barred and if regards be had to the provisions of the M.E.P.S. Act and the rules framed thereunder, undoubtedly, the orders passed by the tribunal under section 9 as well as orders passed by the Education Officer, under Rule 12 of the M.E.P.S. Rules, are final in nature and there is a forum provided to deal with almost every grievance relating to service matters of the employees in the private schools. In a civil suit filed under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot go beyond giving a declaration or granting relief as may be provided under the Specific Reliefs Act. As against this, the powers given to the tribunal under section 11 and 13 of the M.E.P.S-Act are by way of a full, complete and speedy remedy, in as much as, the tribunal is empowered to substitute the punishment or modify the punishment order and grant relief, including reinstatement in service with or without backwages or part of backwages or compensation. Undoubtedly, such a relief cannot be granted by the Civil Court while decreeing a suit for declaration, etc. It would not be in the interest of employees in the private schools to hold that the remedy of filing a civil suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not barred under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. The employees in private schools may consist of teaching and nonteaching and so far as nonteaching employees are concerned, they may have a remedy of a dual nature in as much as approach the school tribunal under section 9 in respect of the matters provided thereunder or to the Education Officer in respect of the matters regarding seniority or any other grievance and alternatively, to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Court, under the provisions of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. However, so far as the teaching staff is concerned, they have the remedy only under the M.E.P.S. Act and the Rules framed thereunder in respect of the service matters and for both, the teaching as well as nonteaching staff, the remedy of filing a civil suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the matters set out in section 9 of the Act and Rule 12 of the M.E.P.S. Rules is impliedly barred, in view of the enunciations of the Apex Court, as referred to hereinabove. It is, therefore, clear that the law laid down by this Court in the case of Rasta Peth Education Society (supra) can no more be held to be a good law. The view taken by me while disposing the Civil Revision Application No. 930/1999 that a Civil suit, challenging the order of reversal, was not maintainable is correct and the review application, therefore stands rejected.