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We propose to treat C. A. No. 105 of 1961 as a typical case. The relevant facts thereof are briefly these :

In O. S. 46 of 1943 one Ramanathan Chettiar instituted a suit against one Venkatachalam Chettiar in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,285/- due on promisory note dated November 20, 1942 with interest thereon. He eventually obtained a decree for the full claim. In so far as the second defendant is concerned, he was made liable for the decrctal amount to the extent of this interest in the joint family property of himself and his father. The plaintiff assigned the decree in favour of Chidambaram Chettiar, who is the appellant in C. A. 105 of 1961. He filed an execution application but the execution proceedings commenced by him proved infructuous because the first defendant was adjudicated an insolvent on February 27, 1945. On September 9, 1946 a composition of the debts due from the insolvent and his son, the second defendant. was arrived at. To the deed of composition the second defendant was also a party though he was not adjudicated an insolvent. Under that deed the creditors, including the four appellants before us, agreed to take 40% of the dues, except one creditor who was to be paid a little more. The defendants, it may be mentioned, bad extensive money-lending business in Burma and the bulk of their property was situate in that country. Under the composition arrangement the entire property of the defendants, both in India and in Burma was to vest in four trustees, one of whom was the insolvent, that is, the first defendant to the suit. Two of the trustees were the present appellants, Chidambaram Chettiar and Krishnappa Chettiar, appellant in C. A. 104 of 1961. The fourth trustee was an outsider. The total indebtedness of the defendants, as ascertained on the date on which the composition was effected, was Rs. 2,16,077/4/8/- but it was reduced under the arrangement to Rs. 86,430-13-3. There are four schedules to the composition deed. Schedule A sets out the names of the creditors and the amounts due to them, Schedule B sets out the properties of the defendants and Schedules C and D set out the properties at Leiwo and Meola respectively in Burma. The deed provides for the payment of the reduced amount by the trustees to different creditors from the income of the properties or by sale, or mortgage of those properties within four years from April 14, 1947. The deed further provides for the extension of this time limit "according to exigencies and necessity at the discretion of the first two trustees"
(c) that the acknowledgment relied upon is "'wholly wrong, misconceived and untenable."

According to him there was no acknowledgement of liability of any kind in the notice referred to in the affidavit much less the liability of the second defendant to discharge the decree which had in fact become extinguished and effaced by reason of the composition arrived at on September 9, 1946. In the course of the arguments before the executing court it was urged on behalf of the appellants in those appeals that the four years within which the trustees were required to realise the Burma properties and pay off the debts of the creditors must be regarded as a period during which the execution of the decrees was stayed and that consequently on the principles underlying s. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, that period should be deducted from computing the period of limitation for preferring execution applications. The Subordinate judge, before whom the execution applica- tions were filed, upheld this contention and held that the execution applications were within time. He also held that the execution applications arrived at between the parties operated as an adjustment of the decree on the date on which that composition was effected or from the date on which the adjudication was arrived at and that though the composition could not be certified to the executing court under 0. XXI, r. 2, C. P. C. within the time permitted by law, it could be certified even now at the instance of the decree-holder because it was open to the decree holder to certify an adjustment at any time he liked. According to the learned Subordinate judge, the adjustment precluded each of the appellants from ex- cuting his decree for a period of four years from April 14, 1947 and, therefore, the execution applications were within time. The High Court, however, disagreed with the Subordinate judge on both the grounds and holding that the execution petitions were barred by time allowed the appeals. It may be mentioned that neither of the two courts below has considered the contention of the appellants in these appeals that the letter dated April 19, 1949 sent by the second defendant to two of the trustees operated as an acknowledgment of their liability or that dividends paid to the appellants by the trustees in August, 1949 operated to extend the time of limitation.

Yours sincerely, Sd/- J. C. Galstaun."

The q qestion to be considered was whether this amounted to an acknowledgment of the mortgagee's right. This Court held that it did amount to an acknowledgment and observed thus :

"It is thus clear that acknowledgment as prescribed by s. 19 merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action. It is a mere acknowledgment of the liability in respect of the right in question ; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication. The statement on which a plea of acknowledgment is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgment must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and need not be expressed in words. If the statement is fairly clear then the intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from it. The admission in question need not be express but must be made in circumstances and in words from which the court can reasonably infer that the person making the admission intended to refer to a subsisting liability as at the date of the statement. In construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgment rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered. Stated generally courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred., or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or far-fetched process of' reasoning. Broadly stated that is the effect of the relevant provisions contained in s. 19, and there is really no substantial difference between the parties as to the true legal position in this matter.' In our opinion, this case is not of assistance co the appellants. In the appeals before us though there was a personal liability on the defendants under the various decrees, their liability which was created by the composition deed was only on properties in which they had, consequent on the creation of a trust under the composition deed, only a beneficial interest. This new liability had to be discharged by the trustees in whom the legal title to the property vested Thus there were two different sets of persons who were liable, the defendants and the Trustees and their respective liabilities were distinct. What the defendant No. 2 has referred to is the libility of the Trustees arising under the terms of the deed of composition and could be enforced only against them. To refer to a liability resting on someone else is not to acknowledge one's own liability within the meaning of the word in s. 19. The defendant No. 2 has not even indirectly referred to the decree much less to the liability arising under any of them. In the circumstances we must hold that this letter does not extend the period of limitation. For these reasons we uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss each of these appeals with costs. There will, however, be only one hearing fee.