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4. On a careful and critical examination of most of the leading cases, to which I have been referred, it becomes very easy to trace the confluence of these lines of thought and the consequent confusion drawn into the reasoning. As I have pointed out, the rule laid down in Higgins v. Senior (1841) 8 M. & W. 831 : 11 L.J. Ex. 199 : 58 R.R. 884 is perfectly precise and intelligible, whether well or ill grounded in reason. But as soon as we turn to such cases as Wake v. Harrop (1861) 6 H. & N. 768 : 30 L.J. Ex. 273 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 710 : 4 L.T. (N.S.) 655 : 9 W.R. 788 : 123 R.R. 816 and Cowie v. Witt (1874) 23 W.R. 76 which profess concurrence with Higgins v. Senior (1841) 8 M. & W. 831 : 11 L.J. Ex. 199 : 58 R.R. 884, we shall find that the ratio of the decision is totally different from, and diametrically opposed to, that adopted by Baron Parke in Higgins v. Senior (1841) 8 M. & W. 831 : 11 L.J. Ex. 199 : 58 R.R. 884. So too in the first case of Higgins v. Senior (1841) 8 M. & W. 831 : 11 L.J. Ex. 199 : 58 R.R. 884 Baron Parke felt some difficulty over the very plainly worded; and, therefore, limitative decision in Jones v. Littledale (1837) 6 Ad. & E. 486 : 1 N. & P. 677 : 6 L.J. (N.S.) K.B. 169 : 45 R.R. 542 : 112 E.R. 186 and wished to put it upon a slightly different ground. But I think it may fairly be said that the result of the judgment in Higgins v. Senior (1841) 8 M. & W. 831 : 11 L.J. Ex. 199 : 58 R.R. 884 was to put the law in England on a clear basis as to the rights of parties, and their obligations and liabilities in respect of amplifying the terms of or being strictly bound by the terms of written contracts. Now, observe what happened in the later cases of Wake v. Harrop (1861) 6 H. & N. 768 : 30 L.J. Ex. 273 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 710 : 4 L.T. (N.S.) 655 : 9 W.R. 788 : 123 R.R. 816 and Cowie v. Witt (1874) 23 W.R. 76. Here the contract was made by an agent in his own name and in form directly binding him as principal. No dispute was made of this at the trial, but it was alleged that there was a contemporary understanding between the plaintiff and the agent that the real contract was to be with the principal in Messina. So that when the case came on for trial the plaintiff here not suing the undisclosed principal but the agent, who, on the face of that writing, was primarily and individually bound, the Court seemingly without difficulty or hesitation held that the defendant might evade the responsibility he had undertaken in the writing by parol evidence, proving a contrary understanding which existed at the time the agreement was made. And the language of Baron Bramwell is so liberal that if it really expresses the law in England and were to be transferred to this country,' it would entirely abrogate Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Judge points out that a writing not under seal in England is not a contract but only evidence of the contract. He goes on to say that being in writing, it is conclusive evidence of the contract and the law of England forbids parol evidence to be given of any variation in its terms. So far he keeps to the principle and very nearly the language of Section 92 of our Evidence Act; but immediately thereafter he lays it down that parol evidence may nevertheless Be given to show what was the real contract between the parties: and if this language has any meaning at all, it must mean the real, as contradistinguished from, and opposed to, the apparent contract exhibited in the writing as a whole and its terms in particular. That would mean nothing more nor less than that a party to the writing might give parol evidence to show that it did not express the agreement really entered into between himself and the plaintiff but that there was another and different agreement, and that alone bound them. I say without the slightest hesitation that, notwithstanding the attempts made to put this decision upon a quite different basis, that is the real effect of the language used by Lord Bramwell. The illustrations he gives before coming to that part of his judgment appear to me to lie quite outside the scope of the question he had to answer. It is one thing to say that a man, who intended to sign an agreement to purchase a horse but by accident signed an agreement to purchase another horse or landed estate, might not prove the actual fact, and quite another thing to say that a man, who has deliberately and with his eyes open signed an agreement, with every term of which he was familiar, could introduce parol evidence later on to prove that the agreement was not in substance as it was made to appear in form in the writing. A like distinction is clearly to be drawn between the other illustrations suggested by Lord Bramwell. In every case of the kind 1 am considering, and the Courts were considering in such cases as Higgins v. Senior (1841) 8 M. & W. 831 : 11 L.J. Ex. 199 : 58 R.R. 884; Wake v. Harrop (1861) 6 H. & N. 768 : 30 L.J. Ex. 273 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 710 : 4 L.T. (N.S.) 655 : 9 W.R. 788 : 123 R.R. 816 and Cowie v. Witt (1874) 23 W.R. 76, there is no question of a party appearing as a signatory upon the paper as principal having been trapped by any mistake of fact at the time into signing that which he did not mean to sign. The question to be answered is of a totally different character and the principles governing the cases in which that question arises really appear to me to be restricted to principles of proof and not of equity. In the cases of Wake v. Harrop (1861) 6 H. & N. 768 : 30 L.J. Ex. 273 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 710 : 4 L.T. (N.S.) 655 : 9 W.R. 788 : 123 R.R. 816 and Cowie v. Witt (1874) 23 W.R. 76 the Courts, neglecting the rules of proof altogether, as it seems to me, held that it was an equitable defence which was open to the defendant because the plaintiff knew of the contemporary oral agreement and, therefore, it was inequitable on his part to hold the defendant to the terms of the writing. Now, that may very well be so, but it obviously gives the go-bye to all that is important in principle in the law of evidence. So when we turn to our carefully and exactly drawn Section 92 of the Evidence Act, it is clear that cases of that kind were within the contemplation of the Legislature; for any contemporary oral agreement may be proved, provided that it be not inconsistent with the terms of the writing. But if it be inconsistent, as it was certainly, in my opinion, in all the English cases I have cited, then parol evidence is expressly excluded; and if parol evidence be excluded, the Court would never be in a position to know of the inequitable conduct of the plaintiff and thereupon to give effect to an equitable defence which never ought to have been heard.