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2. After the decision of the Privy Council in Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65 has been published the question of burden of proof first came before a Bench of this High Court in Zamindar of Parlakimedi v. Ramayya ('27) 14 A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 10. There the inamdar claimed that the grant to him consisted of both warams, and he relied upon 47 Mad. 3371 as throwing the burden of proving that they had occupancy rights upon the ryots. It was held by both learned Judges (Phillips and Madhavan Nair JJ.) in separate judgments that that was not the effect of Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65. They considered that if such were its effect, then 47 Mad. 3371 is wholly inconsistent with and must be taken to have overruled Chidambara Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhigal v. Veerama Reddi ('22) 9 A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 292, and such a result, they held, would be impossible unless expressly formulated. The proposition in Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65 as to burden of proof was therefore held to be limited to cases in which the right of the landlord to "the land itself," i. e., to both warams was admitted or proved. In Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65, as already indicated in this judgment, the result of the discussion of the evidence was to show that the landlord was the owner of both warams. In Aiyanars v. Periakaruppan Thevan ('29) 16 A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 617 however a case decided three years later, and without reference to Zamindar of Parlakimedi v. Ramayya ('27) 14 A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 10 another Bench of this Court (Odgers and Wallace JJ.) took a different view. They were inclined to hold, though without any detailed discussion, that it was not easy to reconcile 47 Mad. 3371 with Chidambara Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhigal v. Veerama Reddi ('22) 9 A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 292 but considered that 47 Mad. 3371 being later in point of time was binding upon them. In Jagannadha Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('38) 1938 M.W.N. 1284, Pandrang Row and Venkataramana Rao JJ. hold that the burden in a case such as this rests upon the inamdar and say that "there is nothing in the Privy Council decisions which militates against this view," but this decision on the question of the burden of proof seems to have been an unnecessary one for the disposal of the appeal before them, and there is no discussion of Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65.

4. From the view of Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65 taken by the learned Judges in Zamindar of Parlakimedi v. Ramayya ('27) 14 A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 10 I must express my most respectful dissent. Prom the way in which the judgment in Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65 is constructed, and from the manner in which the paragraphs follow each other it seems to my mind beyond dispute that their Lordships have dealt with the whole of the evidence from the point of view of the necessity for the ryots positively to prove their claims to occupancy rights. Their Lordships state on p. 344 as a matter not disputed that the ryots were tenants of the temple. They admitted that the temple had the melwaram rights, and claimed the kudiwaram rights for themselves. Immediately after the statement of the issue in the case comes the broad and general proposition that a "tenant of lands in India" must prove a right of permanent tenancy which he claims. No doubt their Lordships go on to cite in support of this proposition two previous decisions of the Privy Council which are distinguishable from the case of an inam grant before them, but in their para. 6 they do state, most definitely, that they will consider whether the defendants have proved that they have rights of permanent occupancy under the Madras Estates Land Act, which can mean on the facts of that case only whether they have proved that the lands which they were cultivating were part of an estate, which again can mean only whether in those lands the melwaram alone was granted to the inamdar. If their Lordships meant the doctrine as to burden of proof which they laid down in their para. 4 to apply only to eases where the landlord's title to both varams was already admitted or proved, then that paragraph was bound logically to come not before but after the decision of their Lordships on the evidence as to the terms of the grant. Whether Naina Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65 be held in consistent with earlier Privy Council decisions or not, I cannot resist the conclusion that the proposition of law in para. 4 is a general proposition of law which must be applied to a case such as the one now before me. The juxtaposition of paras. 3 and 4, and the language of the sixth show clearly that a tenant who admits a melwaram right in his landlord and claims an occupancy right in himself, must prove that right and that the Privy Council has not excluded such a tenant from the expression "tenant of lands in India." I hold accordingly on the first of the points for my decision that the burden in the present case lay upon the defendants.