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5. It appears that there were conflicting decisions of different High Courts in relation to the aforesaid provisions. Tendency to fabricate compromise petitions or take frivolous objections to genuine compromise was increasing as a result of which litigation used to linger for years together. Compromise petitions used to be fabricated and filed and for these reasons the legislature felt it necessary to make certain amendments in the aforesaid provisions. According to the amended provisions lawful agreement or compromise is required to be in writing and signed by parties. The subject-matter of the agreement or compromise or satisfaction between the parties to the suit can be not only the subject-matter of the suit but the other matters also. An explanation has been put in Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code to the effect that an agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. A proviso has been added in this rule to the effect that if genuineness of lawful agreement or compromise is disputed in that event, a duty is cast upon the Court to decide the same in the same very suit. Now by virtue of amendment, a party is debarred from challenging the genuineness or otherwise of the compromise by filing another suit and the only remedy is to challenge the same in suit in which it has been filed. By amendment, clause (m) of Order XLIII (1) providing appeal against an order recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction has been deleted and Order XLIII Rule 1-A, Sub-rule (2) has been inserted which provides that in an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should or should not have been recorded. It appears that since an appeal was provided under Clause (m) of Order XLIII (1) of the Code against an order recording or refusing to record compromise, agreement or satisfaction and litigation used to linger by preferring appeal which remained pending for years together, and further progress of the suit was being delayed, the legislature thought it proper to curtail right of appeal against an order recording or refusing to record compromise, agreement or satisfaction at the interlocutory stage of the suit.

(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties."
"Order 43 Rule 1-A Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decrees- -
(2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should or should not have been recorded."

10. It is well settled that appeal is creature of statute and Section 96(1) confers right of appeal upon a party from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction. The use of the words 'every decree' in Section 96(1) shows that the legislature intended to provide appeal against each and every decree. Sub-section (3)' of Section 96 is really an exception to Sub-section (1). The legislature instead of introducing a proviso in Sub-section (1) has introduced separate Sub-section, that is, Sub-section (3). The expression used in Sub-section (3) of Section 96 is that "no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties." In Sub-section (3) the legislature has not used the expression 'decree passed by the Court on the basis of the compromise petition; rather, the expression used is 'decree passed with consent of the parties'. By subsection (3) vested right of appeal has been curtailed in certain circumstances. Therefore, the provision taking away such a vested right has to be const rued very strictly. If the factum of compromise is disputed by a party, then it would mean that parties are disputing whether they consented to the decree or not. In that event, the decree passed on the basis of the compromise petition cannot be said to have been passed with the consent of the parties, as such, appeal would lie under Section 96(1) of the Code against the decree disposing of the suit in terms of the compromise and bar under Sub-section (3) shall not operate. In such an appeal, by virtue of the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Order XLIII Rule 1 -A, it would be open to a party to contest the decree on the ground that compromise should or should not have been recorded. The legislature deleted clause (m) from Order XLIII Rule 1 providing right of appeal against the order recording or refusing to record compromise, agreement or satisfaction, but since the suit is also barred, it has specifically made provision in Sub-rule (2) of Order XLIII Rule 1-A by making a provision that a party can contest the decree on the ground that compromise should or should not have been recorded.

11. It appears that the legislature thought that there may be some difficulty in challenging the order recording or refusing to record compromise in appeal against decree by virtue of the provisions of Section 105 of the Code and; therefore, it has expressly made provision by inserting Sub-rule (2) in Rule 1-A of Order XLIII of the Code. Why Clause (m) has been deleted? The reason for deleting Clause (m) and inserting Sub-rule (2) in Order XLIII Rule 1-A is obviously; to shorten; the litigation aS a matter of fact, the appeal against decree which has been passed disposing of the suit in terms, of the compromise does not lie under Sub-rule (2); of Order XLIII Rule 1-A as the same is not an enabling provision. The language of the Sub-rule (2) is very clear where it has been stated that in appeal against the decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it will be open to contest the decree on the ground that compromise should or should not have been recorded. In such an eventuality, appeal has been provided under Section 96(1) itself in view of the fact that bar put by Sub-section (3) thereof will not operate and Sub-rule (2) aforesaid only makes it explicit that in that appeal, decree can be contested on the ground that compromise should or should not have been recorded.