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3. After service of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code on them, the appellants appeared in the execution case and filed an objection which was numbered as Misc. Case 163 of 1965. The grounds in support of the objection which appeared to have been pressed in the courts below were,--

(i) the decree was not executable as it was vague;

(ii) the execution petition was not maintainable as the compromise decree was void, illegal and incapable of execution; and

(iii) a tenancy was created by virtue of the compromise between the parties and the appellants could not be evicted without a fresh decree.

4. The executing court overruled the objection as to the vagueness of the decree. The vagueness alleged by the appellants was that the compromise petition and decree did not contain any description of property in respect of which compromise was arrived at. The executing court was of the opinion and rightly that the description of the property in respect of which compromise was arrived at could be gathered from the plaint of the suit which was on the record and the execution petition could not fail on the ground of vagueness of the decree. The lower appellate court also confirmed that finding and that has not been challenged before us. The executing court, however, held in favour of the appellants on the other two grounds. It found that the grounds on which the Respondent decree-holder became entitled to evict the appellants judgment-debtors were not grounds on, which he could evict them under the Bihar Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Act. 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') and, therefore, the decree was illegal and could not be executed.

10. Learned Counsel for the Decree-holder Respondent also relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sadasukh Kabra v. Jugal Kishore Singh, ((1957) 61 Cal WN 67) wherein it was held that a judgment by consent is as effective as an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the Court exercises its mind in a contested case and that a decree made on compromise, so long as it stands, operates as an estoppel and binds the parties in the same way as a contested decree and until and unless it is set aside in appropriate proceedings, it remains fully alive and operative and cannot be treated as nullity collaterally. He further relied on a decision of this Court in Muhammad Ismail v. Bibi Shaima, (AIR 1934 Pat 203) wherein it was held that an executing court has no power to discuss the validity of the terms of a compromise decree which it is ordered to execute. These decisions were given on different facts and after the decision of the Supreme Court in Ferozi Lal Jain's case, AIR 1970 SC 794 it cannot be contended that a compromise decree for eviction, in no case, can be challenged before the executing court as a nullity.