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9. The other contention raised in the application was that since the question of determination of partial eviction requires evidence, the matter should be remitted back to the learned court below with opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and thereafter the question should be decided.

10. Arguing on merits of the appeal also the thrust of the submissions was that since there is no material on record enabling the court to decide the question of partial eviction, the matter is required to be sent back to the court below giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence on the question of partial eviction, and decision of the suit without finding so also decision of the question of partial eviction without recording evidence of the parties would be rather without jurisdiction. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand , L.Rs. of Ibrahim and Ors. v. L.Rs. of Fakruddin and Ors. 1997 DNJ (Raj.) 325 and Bharatpur Whole Sale Sahakari Upbhokta Bhandar v. Sohan Lal 1997 (3) WLC 128. As against this the learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent relied upon Hanuman Das v. Sanwal Ram 1982 RLR 916 contending that it is not always necessary as a 'Rule of Thumb' that at this stage the parties should be given opportunity to lead evidence for deciding question of partial eviction. It was also submitted that the question can be and should be decided even by this Court on the material on record, as in the submission of learned Counsel it is not a case where no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing decree in respect of a part of the premises only.

.... If there is already material on record, the satisfaction of the Court as required Under Sub-section (2) of Section 14 can be there and it may not be necessary to frame issue and remit record for recording evidence....

15. Thus according to this judgment this much is clear that if there is material on record, the satisfaction of the Court as required by Section 14(2) can be there and it may not be necessary to frame the issue and remit record for recording evidence.

16. Thereafter even recently this Court (Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.S. Kokje) in Purshottam Lal v. Gangadas reported in 1998 WLC (UC) 92 after referring to any relying upon Rahman's case has held that "while deciding the appeal after considering the evidence or record the court shall apply its mind to this aspect of the matter also if it finds on the evidence on record that partial eviction will satisfy the need of the landlord, it shall grant relief accordingly." It obviously goes without saying that it it does not find or if there is no material on record that the partial eviction will satisfy need of the landlord then a decree for eviction of entire premises has to be passed. Similarly in Girdharilal v. Smt Kanta and Ors. reported in 2000(1) RLW 306 again this Court (Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.K. Sharma) after considering Rehman's case, himself went into the matter holding that "undoubtedly, even in absence of specific pleading, court has to act in compliance of the mandate and give a finding." In the instant case the plaintiff instituted suit in respect of one shop and it was required for the purpose of running hotel along with the other articles the requirement was properly considered on the basis of pleading of the parties by both the courts below. On careful perusal of the material on record reveals that the entire shop is reasonably and bonafidely needed by the plaintiff for the purpose of ingress and installation of the counter. It is well settled law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and if landlord desires to benefically enjoy his own property, his requirement cannot be termed as unreasonable. In view of the requirement of plaintiff as indicated hereinabove, I am of the view that non giving of any finding by the courts below, on the question of partial eviction, does not affect the root of the matter as in the facts and circumstances of the case the partial eviction is not possible.

27. Thus, the provision of Section 14(2), in my humble view is required to read and understood in the light of the law as propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in S. Sanyal's case so also in Habibunnisa's case in a reasonable and rational manner.

28. If the provision of Section 14(2) is read in this spirit, the real object of enactment would be achieved being of protecting avoidable eviction of the tenant from the entire premises, and also satisfying the needs of the landlord by evicting the tenant from the part of the premises only viz. in a manner so as to proceed free from the fetters of indivisibility of the contract of letting. It is established law that the landlord is best Judge of his requirement and once he establishes his requirement and court finds the requirement to be reasonable as well as bonafide, he is thereafter not to be subjected to any further rationing under the garb of provisions of Section 14(2) 'partial eviction' simply because somehow the tenant is continuing there even at the cost of seeing that the plaintiff is simply lead any evidence in this regard or not. While deciding the question of reasonable and bonafide necessity, it should very much become clear to the courts as to what the tenant is doing in the premises, what are his requirements and correspondingly for what purpose the landlord wants the premises or what are his requirements. It is on consideration of these circumstances and facts that the Court has to place itself in the arm chair of the landlord, as well as in that of the tenant, and decide as to whether for the requirement of the tenant as proved by him and found by the Court to be reasonable and bonafide, the Court should venture to break the contract of letting or should maintain the indivisibility and thus should see as to whether ordering partial eviction would not cause any hardship to either of the parties. Then only it should order partial eviction otherwise the decree for eviction for entire premises is to be passed. In my this view I am also supported by a judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Satwant Kaur v. Dhund Singh which again was a case of single shop having openings on both sides, front and the back which were already separated by a wall wherein the High Court had directed partial eviction, and Hon'ble the Supreme Court considered the situation of shop viz. it having more than one opening and capable of being partitioned to satisfy the needs of both the tenant as well as the landlord, and affirmed the findings of the High Court in the peculiar circumstances of that case. If Hon'ble the Supreme Court were meaning to lay it down as a rule of thumb as is sought to be contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant, then the Apex Court would not have gone on that question and would have straightway remitted the matter.

29. There is yet another aspect of the matter viz. that the provision of Section 14 were added way back in the year 1975 and obviously when it was interpreted to be retrospective, it had to be assumed that the parties could not, and did not, either take pleadings, or lead evidence, or bring material on record to enable the court to decide the question of partial eviction. In my feeling it is more likely that the two cases decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court being Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand and Ors. (supra) and Krishan Murari Prasad v. Mitra Sen (supra) also appear to be the out come of this very situation, inasmuch as Rahman's case was decided by Hon'ble the Supreme Court on 7.12.1977. The appeal filed before Hon'ble the Supreme Court was barred by time which delay was condoned and as found above the parties had litigated in that case in the three courts below being the trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court. The legislation in that case is of the year 1966. Likewise in Krishan Murari's case the appeal was decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 15.1.1992. There also the matter was litigated out in the courts below and the legislation in that case was of the year 1982. As against this, in the present case, the legislation is of the year 1975 and the suit was decreed by the learned trial court also as late as on 24.11.1993. The suit was filed of course on 31.5.1984, but then it was also around 9 years after commencement of the legislation, by which time enough law at least including the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Rahman's case was very much available. In this view of the matter, if the present case were to be considered, my apprehensions gets strengthened, inasmuch as after litigating the suit for around 16 years and without even inviting attention of the courts below, on this question, the tenant approached this Court as if it is his indefeasible right to sleep over the issue for an indefinite time, and then put this Court in a helpless condition, to simply bow to the dictates of the tenant to frame an additional issue and give opportunity to the parties to lead evidence, and thereby practically reopen the specific part of the trial. Not only this in the ordinary course of circumstances if this appeal were to come up for hearing in due course, it would have taken another 15 years, and then the poor landlord would have been at 'squre one'. The miseries of the landlord are writ large inasmuch as he wanted the suit shop for starting his business as one of the brothers in the array of plaintiffs, unfortunately suffered an accident way back in 1982, attracting invalidity, and who was in his 30's at the time of filing of the suit. It is in this background that even when, on 27.4.2000, the issue was being remitted, no request was made for any permission to lead evidence. While hearing arguments on 10.8.2000 learned Counsel for the appellant categorically admitted that no request was made by him on 27.4.2000, for any permission to lead evidence. It is thus clear that the present is a case where the tenant is out and out to claim this Court to have become helpless, except to bow to the dictates of the tenant, to remit the case again for recording evidence, inasmuch as on being pointedly asked as to why did the learned Counsel not ask for opportunity to lead evidence, the astonishing answer was, that it is of no consequence, and the court is bound to remit the matter back for leading evidence at the pain of vitiating the decree for eviction as "Without Jurisdiction." I am also reminded of similar other incident, being in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 77/1996 where was decided by me on 11.7.2000, wherein also no issue was framed on the question of partial eviction, and no evidence was led. However, the learned lower appellate court, after itself making search of the record, could locate the dimensions of the shop, situation thereof, and placement of the doors etc. and therefore, declined to request of the tenant to remit the matter to the learned trial court for evidence and deceased the entire suit for eviction. Against that decree while hearing the appeal, despite my persistently asking the learned Counsel for the appellant did not and could not point out any counter balancing circumstance, and simply stressed on this very submission, that this Court has no option but to direct an additional issue to be framed and to remit it for fresh decision after recording evidence. It is a different story that appreciating the finding of fact on the question of partial eviction, and being supported by material on record, relying upon the various judgments of this court the appeal was dismissed. But then in my view, in view of this growing tendency of the tentants, such indefeasible claim cannot be conceded to the tenant.