Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

A separate entity used in making-up garments and other articles, consisting «t' single layer or multiple layers of material loosely held in place along one or more edges. It does not modify the properties of the main fabrics with which it is associated but can impart certain performances characteristics to the article.

The well defined term in the Textile terminology, the lining material has to have certain specific functional utility as set out above. In the present case, as seen from the records, the use of the material imported has been demonstrated by producing two reversible jackets before the learned lower appellate authority, who after seeing the same has held that since the material has been used on the inner side of the jacket, the same can be said to be answered to the use as lining material. We observe that the learned appellant Collector has rightly urged that this use cannot be taken to be as use as lining material. The use as we see it is it makes the body of the garment itself and forms one side of the reversible jacket and it is not in the nature lining material as given in the Handbook on Glossary of Textile terms Bureau of Indian Standards. Further, we observe that once it is accepted that the goods are gents suiting material, so far as its normal use is concerned the same stands established, i.e., as suiting material for gents and further it establishes that the material imported has neither been manufactured as lining material nor it has been held out to be so by the manufacturers. It is further seen that there is no plea that the leather jackets using such a material have in fact been exported by the respondents or by somebody else. The only plea is that the supplier of the goods has supplied this stating that these should be used as lining material in the leather jackets to be supplied to them. As stated, \mmn facie the use, as demonstrated by the respondents cannot be taken to be that as the lining material. Primn facie it is not possible to accept that textile material which have been manufactured for a specific purpose, i.e., for gents suiting etc. can be taken to be lining material when the lining material itself has been defined as answering to a specific description and use which prima facie is not the case here. The licence carries a specific description of goods as outer lining material and it has to be established that the goods as imported have been manufactured and marketed as lining material and further it is that these are in the nature of outer lining material. In our view the respondents have not established set. The letter produced from the supplier cannot be taken to be establishing in any way the nature and character of the use of the goods. Merely because the supplier has stated that these have to be used lining materials in the leather jackets for which they have placed an order cannot be taken, prima facie in any way demonstrative of the fact that the material imported are outer lining material. In our view even this letter does not show as to on what context this was written by the supplier of the goods and no correspondence leading to the writing of this letter has been produced. The learned appellate authority should have gone into the evidentiary value of this letter before accepting the same. Prima facie the learned lower appellate authority should not have relied on this letter for arriving at his conclusions. Further, we find that the learned appellate authority has taken cognisance of the letters produced by the respondents from the Council for Leather Exports, Madras and the Chamber of Commerce, Taiwan, stating that synthetic/polyester fabrics men's wear and suiting fabrics can be used as lining material in leather garment. The learned appellate authority should have examined the relevance of these letters before accepting the same, with reference to the description of the goods in licence, viz. outer lining, in the light of what we have observed above. It is further seen that the learned appellate authority in his order has taken note of the fact that the licence under reference has been transferred to the respondents under para 67 of the Export Import Policy and therefore since the export obligation has been already fulfilled in respect of this licence, the respondents, as per the licence need not show that the materials now imported have been used earlier by the licence holder in the goods exported. We observe that under Chapter VII of the Policy which bears the heading "Duty Exemption Scheme" under para 47, raw materials intermediates, components, consumable, parts, accessories, packing materials and computer software required for direct use in the product to be exported may be permitted duty free for processing and export by the competent authority under the categories of licences mentioned in this chapter. In para 48 the provision is for issue of advance licence and in para 49 there is a provision for value based advance licence and in para 50 the quality based advance licence. In para 51 it is clearly set out that the standard input-output norms for the imports and exports for the grant of both value based and quantity based advance licences and value addition norms for value based licences shall be in accordance with the norms published by the Director General of Foreign Trade in the Handbook of Procedures (Vol. II). This clearly shows that for the licence in question there is a nexus prima facie between the goods allowed import and the goods exported and it is not correct to say that the respondents could have imported any goods so long as some possibility of the use of the goods can be shown in the export of the goods. It is seen that the whole scheme in Chapter VII is to facilitate the import of goods for use in the export goods and the use of the goods prima facie has to be related to the exported goods. The respondents in the present case have not shown that this is so. We observe that the learned appellate authoritv has not adverted to the issue in the context of the Policy provision as setout in Chapter VII and the Revenue has rightly urged that the constraints as laid down in this chapter have to inform the type of goods that can be imported. In view of the above we hold that the learned appellate authority's order prima facie is not proper and we, therefore, allow the prayer of the Revenue for stay of the impugned order. Since the issue arises in the context of the export of the goods, the matter should be heard at an early date and the date can be fixed at the convenience of both parties.