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Showing contexts for: subsequent qualification in G.Varadharajulu Naidu vs The State Of Tamilnadu on 5 January, 2012Matching Fragments
13. Similar was the view taken subsequently by the Supreme Court vide its judgment in Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54. In paragraph Nos, 16, 16 and 20, it was observed as follows:
"15. It was held: (SCC pp. 21-22, para 6) So far as the first issue referred to in our order dated 1-9-1995 is concerned, we are of the respectful opinion that majority judgment (rendered by Dr. T.K. Thommen and V. Ramaswami, JJ.) is unsustainable in law. The proposition that where applications are called for, prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment. This is also the proposition affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan3. The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview. The said decision is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that in absence of any cut-off date specified in the advertisement or in the rules, the last date for filing of an application shall be considered as such.