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(7) The main contention of the appellants is that these diamonds are nto "baggage" within the meaning of Sections 77 and 80 read with the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958 and, therefore, the detention receipt issued to the respondent under Section 80 would be of no avail to prtoect him against the application of Section 110 and Section 111(d) of the said Act.
(8) The expression "baggage" has nto been defined by the said Act but it is included in the definition of "goods" in sub-section 22 of Section 2. The definition of "goods" given in this act is an inclusive definition and, apart from baggage, it also includes "any toher kind of moveable property." One argument the appetlants is that since "baggage" is included in "goods", the latter cannto be included in the former. This argument loses sight of the fact that "any toher kind of moveable property" is also included in the definition of "goods". Any item of moveable property or any article which may be "goods" can, therefore, be a part of or contained in "baggage".
(10) Baggage is synonmous with luggage. Webster gives the following meaning of baggage:-
"Agroup of traveling bags, trunks, or btoh especially when packed and in transit: personal belongings of travellers either carried by hand or checked with a carrier: luggage".

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the following meaning to baggage:- "THE collection of property in packages that a traveller takes with him on a journey: Luggage."

(11) Therefore, the word "baggage" is a comprehensive term which means the luggage of a passenger, accompanied or unacompanied, and comprises of the trunks or bags and the personal belongings of the passenger contained therein and it must be in this comprehensive sense in which "baggage" has been used in Sections 77 and 80 of the Customs Act. If "baggage" in section 80 of this Act means only bona fide baggage as contemplated by clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958, there will hardly be any occasion for the application of section 80 of the Customs Act. I am, therefore, of the opinion that "baggage" has to be given the larger and ordinary meaning.

(12) Section 80 talks of "any article" which is dutiable or the import of which is prohibited and the expression "any article" is comprehensive enough to include an article which is nto a part of bona fide baggage as contemplated by section 79 or "personal effects" as specified by clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules. It may be contained in the baggage of a passenger. If the passenger declares such an article under Section 77, be may still import it if he is prepared to pay the duty and if its import is nto prohibited. If the passenger is nto prepared to pay the duty and/or cannto produce the requisite import license, he will nto be allowed to clear it for import. In such a case, he may make a request to the proper officer to detain such article for the purpose of being returned to him on his leaving India. It does nto matter if the article is in such quantities or is of such value that it is an article of merchandise and cannto be said to be comprised in bona fide baggage or personal effects. The only requirement of Section 80 is that such an article is contained in the baggage in the larger sense which includes the trunks and bags in which, the luggage is contained. By making the declaration under Section 77 and the request under Section 80, the passenger expresses his intention nto to import such an article. That being so, it cannto be said that such an article has been imported or attempted to be imported Within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 111 or becomes liable to seizure under Section 110 of the Customs Act. I am, therefore, of the view that the term "baggage" as used in Section 77 and 80 of this Act, is nto confined merely to bona fide baggage within the meaning of Section 79 of the Act or to personal effects as defined by Clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958 and includes any article contained in the baggage even though it be in commercial quantities.

(13) Reliance has been placed by the appellants on a decision of the Supreme Court in re: State of Maharashtra v. George(1). That was a case under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The passenger was carrying gold bars concealed in a jacket which he wore. He remained sitting in the plane which was on a flight from Zurich to Manila and which landed enroute at Santa Cruz Airport in Bombay. The passenger was asked by the Customs authorities to come out of the plane and the gold was seized. The gold was nto declared or entered in the manifest of the plane. It was contended on behalf of the passenger that the gold was his personal luggage and nto cargo and, therefore, it was nto necessary to have it declared and entered in the manifest. Such declaration was required by the second proviso to the ntoification issued on November 8, 1962 under Section 80. This ntoification gave general permission, inter alia, to the bringing of gold into any port or place in India when the gold was on through transit to a place outside the territory of India but the second proviso required that such gold must be declared in the manifest for transit as 'same btotom cargo' or 'transhipment cargo'. This ntoification superseded an earlier ntoification dated 25/8/1948 which did nto contain any provision like the second proviso to the ntoification dated November 8, 1962. It is relevant to mention that it was conceded on behalf of the State of Maharashtra "that if the exemption ntoification which applied to the pre- sent case was that contained in the ntoification of the Reserve Bank dated 25/8/1948 the respondent had nto committed any offence since (a) he was a through passenger from Geneva to Manila as shown by the ticket which he had and the manifest of the aircraft, and besides (b) he had nto even gto down from the plane". It was, therefore, by reason of the second proviso that it was held by the Supreme Court "that the proper construction of the term 'cargo' when it occurs in the ntoification of the Reserve Bank is that it is used as contradistinguished from personal luggage in the law relating t& the carriage of goods." In the absence of a similar provision under the Customs Act or in the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958, I do nto find it possible to accept the contention of the appellants that "baggage" used in Section 80 of the Customs Act means only personal baggage or bona fide baggage under Section 79 or personal effects under Clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules. I may only add that merchandise per se is nto excluded from the term "personal effects" used in the explanation to Clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958. The exclusion is in respect of merchandise which is imported for commercial purposes.