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Shri- Kohli on behalf of the respondents has tried to support the order of the HIgh Court and has submitted that, as observed by Madholkar, J. in Haridas v. State of West Bengal(1) the words "or :falsely charges" in s. 211, I.P.C. are not restricted by the words "institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding". The Legislature according to the submission has provided in this section for two kinds of acts : (i) the institution of proceeding and

(ii) making a false charge. This section 'in the words of Mudholkar, J., added Shri Kohli, is not limited to the institution of a complaint upon a false charge as such an interpretation would completely shut out criminal proceedings in which no charge of an offence has been made. It is on this. observation that the learned counsel has tried to build and ,develop the contention that when the appellant stated in the witness box as P.W.4 that he had seen Mohd. Zahir, Usman, Shahanshah, Puttan and lzhar Hussain in the marpit and thereafter in the identification' parade in the jail, he had made a false charge against lzhar Hussain and was, therefore, liable to be prosecuted for an offence under s. 211, I.P.C. The counsel has in this connection expressly stated that he does not want to prosecute the appellant for any offence mentioned in s. 479- A, Cr.P.C. The bar resulting from non-complaince with that section would, therefore, be ineffective so far as prosecu- tion for other offences is concerned. In support of his case he has relied on ss. 195 (1 ) (b) and 476, I.P.C.Section 195 so far as relevant reads Prosecution for contempt (1) No Court shall of lawful authority of take cognizance public servants.

For the purposes of this sub-section, a Presidency Magistrate shall be deemed to be a Magistrate of the first class."

Now, in the present case, the Additional District Magistrate on November 30, 1966 acquitted all the accused of the offences charged. He did not hold that the appellant had falsely charged. Izhar Hussain with any offence, nor did he consider it expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute him for an offence under s. 211, I.P.C. As already noticed when in January, 1967, Izhar Hussain applied to that court under ss. 476/479-A, Cr.P.C. for the prosecution of the appellant and two others, the court felt that in view of the decision in Kuppa Goundan's case (supra) the proceedings under S. 476, Cr-P.C. were incompetent. Section 479-A has not been relied upon by Shri Kohli and in our opinion rightly because on the admitted facts in this case that section has not been complied with. In Kuppa Goundan's case (supra) it was observed that the scheme of S. 479-A, Cr.P.C. is to enact a special procedure for more expeditious and effective manner of dealing with certain cases of perjury and fabrication of false evidence of witness in the course of judicial proceedings. But the necessary condition for applying this section is that the court must form an opinion that a particular witness or witnesses is or are giving false evidence and at the time of delivering its judgment record a finding to that effect. This was not done in this case. Now, by virtue of s. 479- A(6) no proceeding can be taken against Santokh Singh under ss. 476 to 479 for giving false evidence. Shri Kohli's argument, as already noticed, is that the appellant is not being prosecuted for giving false evidence as indeed that is not permissible now, but only for falsely charging lzhar Hussain in his evidence in court. The short question posed, therefore, is, if by giving false evidence as a witness against Izhar Hussain the appellant can be said to have charged him within the contemplation of s-211, I.P.C. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then it will have to be determined whether there is in fact a false accusation and finally whether it is expedient in the, interest of justice on the facts and circumstances of the present case to direct a complaint to be filed under s. 21 1, I.P.C. This section as its marginal note indicates renders punishable false charge of offence with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an offence under s. 211, I.P.C. is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a' person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the appellant cannot be said to have instituted any criminal proceeding against any person. So, that part of s. 211, I.P.C. is eliminated. Now, the expression "falsely charges'.' in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. "To falsely charge" must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words "falsely charges" have to be, read along with the expression "institution of criminal proceeding". Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been. used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be' embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the "charges" should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion. Statement on oath falsely supporting the prosecution case against an accused person more appropriately amounts to an offence under ss. 193 and 195, I.P.C. and not under s. 21 1, I.P.C. We do not think that the offences contemplated by ss. 193/195,I.P.C. on the one hand and S. 211, I.P.C. on the other were intended by the legislature, in this context, to overlap so as to make it optional whether to proceed under one or the other. The High Court was, therefore, in error in thinking that in the present case the appellant's statement as a witness in the trial court, could be construed as a charge against lzhar Hussain. Once it is held that no offence under s. 211, I.P.C. can be considered to have been com- mitted, then no other question arises for, as conceded by Shri Kohli, Section 479-A would bar prosecution for giving false evidence.