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52. It was not disputed before us that in the absence of a merger it might have been possible for Timma the mortgagee to enforce the liability under the document Ex. F-1 even after he had succeeded to the impartible estate; but this, it was alleged, was due to the fact that there was a pre-existing liability which the Kala-hasti estate was bound to discharge. If the pre-existing liability could have been enforced by Timma even after he had succeeded to Akkappa, no objection could be lawfully raised to Timma, the mortgagor, executing a deed of mortgage in favour of Chinnamma, Rao although she might have been then really a trustee for the benefit of Timma, the mortgagee. It may at times happen that a person may come to occupy two capacities and may hold rights in one capacity against himself in another capacity. But it would not necessarily follow that his rights and duties are on account of that incident extinguished. A manager or karta of a joint Hindu family may in his capacity as a karta legitimately sell a joint family property for joint family necessity or benefit to one of the members of the family or even to himself in his individual capacity as long as the transaction is not fraudulent or he does not take any undue advantage of his position. He cannot be said in a case like this to be contracting with himself. He has really a dual capacity. Similarly, after his succession to the impartible estate, Timma occupied two capacities and was in possession of two kinds of property. He was a mortgagee to start with and became a representative of his mortgagor independently of his will. Moreover his personal property, even if it was not ancestral, would devolve on his widow and other heirs in accordance with the rules of Mitakshara while the impartible estate would not be, taken by his heirs but by one who would be entitled to succeed in accordance with the rules of lineal primogeniture. To such a case, decisions in Vallabhdas Mulji v. Pranshanker Narbeshankar A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 24, Henderson v. Astwood (1894) A.C. 150, Boyee v. Edbrooke (1903) 1 Ch.D. 836 and Farrar v. Farrars, Ltd. (1888) 40 Ch.D. 395, would have no application. In the first case, (i.e. Vallabhdas Mulji v. Pranshanker Narbeshankar A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 24), certain mortgagees, who were authorised by their mortgage deeds to sell the mortgaged property on default by the mortgagor, sold it by auction to a benamidar or a trustee for themselves and it was held that the transaction did not affect the relations between the mortgagor and the mortgagees and the sale was void and unenforceable. This case was so decided as first of all the mortgagees were held to have been merely authorised to sell the property and not to purchase it themselves which if allowed would have put them in a position where there, would have been a conflict of duty and interest (their duty being to sell to the best advantage of the mortgagor and their interest being to purchase to the best advantage for themselves) and, secondly as the mortgagees' capacities were not different and continued to remain the same throughout. They worked as mortgagees all along and could not sell the property to themselves.