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This petition has been preferred by Gurmeet Kaur challenging the order dated 04.06.2008 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib on an application moved under Section 319 Cr.P.C. by the prosecution, whereby the petitioner has been summoned to face trial along with other co-accused.

Counsel for the petitioner contends that the order, quashing whereof has been prayed by the petitioner in the present petition, summoning the petitioner as an additional accused, is without any application of mind and has been passed in a mechanical manner and in total disregard of the requirement of Section 319 Cr.P.C. He submits that the petitioner has been summoned merely on the basis of a statement made by Yadwinder Singh PW-1, wherein the petitioner has been named in his statement before the trial Court. He submits that in the FIR and in the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the name of the petitioner was mentioned, however, after investigation, no challan was presented against her. Even at the stage of framing of charge, no charge was framed against the petitioner and nothing new has come in evidence which would call for exercise of powers by the trial Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C.. He further submits that even the statement of Yadwinder Singh PW1 i.e. the Examination-in-Chief has not yet been completed, what to say about his cross-examination, but the trial Court, on this incomplete statement, has proceeded to summon the petitioner. He relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi vs. Mohd. Rafiq and another, 2007 (2) RCR (Criminal) 762 to contend that before the completion of the statement of the witness, the same could not have been taken into consideration for exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. He further submits that powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only after the Court arrives at a satisfaction that there exists possibility that the accused, so summoned, is likely to be convicted. In this case such satisfaction having not been arrived at by the trial Court, the order of summoning is not sustainable. He relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Rupinder Kaur vs. State of Punjab, 2008 (4) RCR (Criminal) 235 in support of his contention.

I have heard the counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case.

For deciding this case, the mandate of Section 319 Cr.P.C. is required to be understood so that proper decision can be reached. Section 319 Cr.P.C. reads as follows:

"319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.-(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.

A perusal of the order hereinabove does not fulfil the requirement of exercise of extraordinary powers conferred on the Court, which is required to be used very sparingly under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Mere existence of prima facie case against the accused does not fulfill the requirement of higher standard set up for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. by the trial Court. The test of prima facie case to proceed against the accused may be sufficient for taking cognizance of the offence at the stage of framing of charge in terms of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and for summoning persons who may have been kept in Column No. 2 of the challan at that stage but that would not be enough to summon a person as an additional accused while exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Merely because the accused have been named in the FIR, in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and thereafter before the trial Court by the prosecution witness and some involvement in the commission of offence is shown, would not give jurisdiction to the Court to invoke its powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. What is further required is that the material, which is brought before the Court, must be of such a nature as would satisfy the Court that it would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned. No satisfaction in this regard has been recorded by the trial Court, which would justify the exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. invoked by the Court. The order, therefore, passed by the trial Court cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh vs. State of Haryana (supra) has held that it would be difficult to accept the contention that the term "evidence" as used in Section 319 Cr.P.C. would mean evidence, which is tested by cross-examination. The relevant portion has been reproduced above, which makes it abundantly clear that it is primarily the satisfaction of the Court which would be the determinative factor for exercising the powers of Section 319 Cr.P.C. Of course such exercise of powers needs to fulfil the tests as have been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its various decisions.