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24. The scope of Section 44 of the Evidence Act has been elucidated in a number of judicial pronouncements. Fraud, in order to avoid a judgment, must be extrinsic or collateral to the adjudication involved in the judgment and should not have been or deemed to have been dealt with by the court in the impugned judgment (see Subramaniam v. Nagaramma and Ors. and Weavers Mills Ltd. v. Balkis Ammal and Ors. . Similarly, a contention that the claim urged by one of the parties was a false one or that he secured the decree by letting in false or perjured evidence, even if true, would not amount to fraud of the kind that would nullify the decree in the previous suit. The falsity or truth of the claim must be deemed to have been adjudicated by the court when it decreed the claim. Fraud affecting the validity of the decree must be actual positive fraud in the form of a meditated and intentional contrivance to keep the opposite party in ignorance of the real facts of the case of the case (vide - supra) If the previous suit or other proceeding were started with the object of injuring the opponent, there may not be any collusion in securing the judgment, order or decree. In order to avoid a decree on the ground of fraud, the fraud must be extrinsic to the proceedings before court - Yohannan v. Harikrishnan Nair . If the second suit practically amounts to a re-hearing of the first, the second suit should not be heard (see Bhikaji v. Balvant AIR 1927 Bom. 510. In a suit to set aside a decree on the ground of fraud, it is open to the court to consider the question as to whether the claim of the plaintiff in the previous suit was true or false only if the plaintiff is able to show that there was non-service of summons and the same is attributable to a fraud committed by the other party in the previous suit with the object of keeping the present plaintiff in ignorance of the suit and of preventing him from placing his case before the court (see Ramchandra v. Firm Prabhulal AIR 1927 Pat. 183. When the Court is asked to set aside a decree on the ground of fraud, the only issue for its decision is whether the decree was procured by fraud. For deciding that issue the court cannot sit in appeal over the impugned judgment or decree. An unsuccessful party also cannot be allowed to get round the rule of res judicata and prove that the judgment was wrong because the court came to a wrong conclusion on the evidence before it. For the purpose of Section 44 of the Evidence Act an ex parte decree stands on the same footing as a decree in a defended suit. Mere non-service of summons does not constitute fraud. The decree will be set aside only if it is proved to have been obtained by fraudulent suppression of summons. In order to get rid of a former judgment it is not sufficient for a person to prove constructive fraud (not deliberate). He must prove actual positive fraud, a meditated or intentional contrivance to keep the parties and the court in ignorance of the real facts of the case and the obtaining of that judgment by such contrivance. A prior judgment cannot be upset on a mere general allegation of fraud or collusion. It must be shown how, when, where and in what way the fraud was committed. A party alleging fraud is bound to establish it by cogent evidence. Mere suspicion cannot be accepted as proof.