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Showing contexts for: selection process completed in Arunachal Pradesh Public Serv.Comm.& ... vs Tage Habung & Ors on 1 May, 2013Matching Fragments
10. In the result, the Writ Petition stands allowed. The Respondents more particularly, Respondent No.2, Secretary, APPSC is directed to declare the result of the Writ Petitioners taking into consideration the criteria of selection that was applicable on or before 19.12.2006 and if they fulfill the criteria, they should be called for viva voce test.”
6. However, in compliance of Court’s order dated 30th September, 2008 passed in W.P. No. 271 of 2008, the Commission vide Notification dated 14th October, 2008 published the list of candidates who had secured a minimum of 33% marks in each written examination paper and who had secured 45% marks out of the aggregate total marks in the written examination papers. Thereafter, the respondents herein filed a writ petition being No. 417 of 2008 (renumbered at Principal Seat as Writ Petition (C) No. 4902 of 2008) challenging the O.M. dated 7th January, 2008. Meanwhile, the Commission completed the selection process and declared the results of viva voce test vide Notification dated 17th January, 2009 pursuant to which 100 candidates were selected for the posts.
“33. From careful consideration of the extensive arguments so advanced on behalf of the parties narrated herein above and also having gone thoroughly the entire material available on record. It is seen that significantly the impugned O.M. dated 07.01.2008 was not published by the APPSC as required under rule 11 of the rules but it was issued by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh itself and the same has also only been adopted by the APPSC vide Notification dated 16.04.2008 and that too after completion of the entire selection process.
22. In Sushil Kumar Ghosh’s Case, the High Court reiterated the principles laid down in Calton’s Case holding that after the commencement of selection process if the amendment of the rules was made prospectively changing the eligibility criteria, amending the rules would not affect the selection and appointment as the selection process which had already commenced had to be completed in accordance with law as it stood at the time of commencement of the selection.
16. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the decision rendered in K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 did not notice the decisions in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985) 4 SCC 417 as well as in K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala (2006) 6 SCC 395 and, therefore, should be regarded either as decision per incuriam or should be referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration, cannot be accepted. What is laid down in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is that it is always open to the authority making the rules regulating the selection to prescribe the minimum marks both for written examination and interview. The question whether introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview after the entire selection process was completed was valid or not, never fell for consideration of this Court in the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent. While deciding the case of K. Manjusree the Court noticed the decisions in: (1) P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India; (1984) 2 SCC 141, (2) Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 721; and (3) Durgacharan Misra v.