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37. It must be admitted that this Court has not adopted a uniform course in dealing with the question as to whether appeals of the class now under consideration lie or not.

38. In certain reported decisions referred to by my learned colleague and myself in our order of reference to the Full Bench the question as to how far Sections 588 and 629 of the C. P. C., control the provisions of Section 15 of the Letters Patent has been considered, the view taken being that where those Sections expressly direct that orders passed under them are final there can be no appeal under the Letters Pattont. In Vanangamudi v. Ramasami I. L, R., 14 M. 406, where an appeal under the Letters Patent from an order passed under Section 622 of the C. P. C. was considered, the only question adjudicated on in considering as to whether an appeal lay or not was as to whether the order was a judgment, The point now at issue was not raised. In a number of decisions reported in the 16th and 19th volumes of the I. L. R., Madras, appeals preferred under Section 15 of the Letters Patent Act from orders under 622 of the Civil Procedure Code were heard and disposed of, but in all these cases as far as can be seen from the reports the question as to whether such appeals lay was not discussed. In Venkata Reddi v. Taylor I. L. R., 17 M. 100, the question as to whether, when a single Judge of this Court acting under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887) revises a decree of a Small Cause Court, his order could be appealed against under Section 15 of the Letters Patent was considered and it Was decided that notwithstanding Section 27 of that Act such an appeal lay. It appears to me that it would be difficult to differentiate this case from the one now under consideration. If, in spite of Section 27 of the Small Cause Courts Act, an appeal can be preferred from an order passed under Section 25 of that Act it seems to me to follow logically that notwithstanding Section 591 of the Civil Procedure Code an appeal lies from an order passed by a single Judge under Section 622, Civil Procedure Code, I cannot find any definite rulings on this question in the reported decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts. The very important decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to in the order of reference (I. L. R., 9 C. 482) remains for consideration. The ruling of their Lordships to be found there as to the effect of Section 588, Civil Procedure Code, is as follows: "It only remains to observe that their Lordships do not think that Section 588, Act IX of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the High Court to the Full Bench."-The ruling has been recently considered at length in a judgment by Subrahmania Aiyar and Benson, JJ., reported at I. L. R., 20 M. 407. It has there been held by Mr. Justice Benson (pp. 411 and 412) that the words used by their Lordships, as quoted in the present order of reference, do not lay down as a general rule that Section 588 of the of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply to any case in which an appeal is sought to be made under Section 15 of the Letters Patent from the order of a single Judge. It is pointed out that in the case there under consideration a Judge of the High Court of Calcutta had by an order passed under Section 610, Civil Procedure Code, refused to transmit to the Court of First Instance for execution a decree of the Privy Council and Mr. Justice Benson was of opinion (following no doubt the view expressed by Edge, C. J., in Banno Bibi v. Mehdi Husain I. L. R., 11 Article 375 and Muhammad Naim-ul-lah Khan v. Ishan-ul-lah Khan Article 14 Article 226) that although the order made by the Judge was under Section 610, C. P. C., yet it was none the less an oder determining a question arising between parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution thereof (Section 244, Civil Procedure Code). "It was therefore," Mr. Justice Benson goes on to observe, "an order of the kind expressly declared by Section 2 of the Code to fall within the definition of "a decree" and, as such, it was obviously an order against which an appeal would lie as against a decree." According to. Mr. Justice Benson the language used by their Lordships amounted to nothing more than this. "Section 588, no doubt, has the effect of restricting appeals in the case of orders which are not decrees, but it does not apply to such a case as this before us which is an order in execution and, therefore, a decree. When therefore such an order has been made by a single Judge an appeal lies to the Full Court," With all due deference to my learned colleague, I cannot accept the inter-pretation here put on the clear and unambiguous language of their Lordships. There is nothing to show that they looked upon the order of Mr. Justice Pontifex then under consideration (vide I. L. R., 6 C. 594), as a decree under Section 244, C. P. C., or that the provisions of that Section were in their minds when they made the observation under consideration. If the report is referred to, it will be found (pp. 486 and 487 that Counsel for the respondent strongly urged on the consideration) of their Lordships that whatever might have been the case before the enactment of Section 588 of Act X of 1877, the provisions of that Section rendered it clear that there was no appeal. Their Lordships, it is shown, duly considered this argument and overruled it in the observation now under consideration and this being the view that they have taken of Section 588 of the C. P. C., it can scarcely, I think, be doubted that they would take a similar view of the argument that Section 591 takes away an appeal given by Section 15 of the Letters Patent if the question came before them for decision. It appears to me to be very difficult to understand why, if the Legislature intended by Sections 588, 591 and 629 to take away the right of appeal, from decisions of single Judges of the High Court granted by Section 15 of the Letters Patent, this very important change in the law was not made by clear and distinct enactment. It must, I think, in considering this question, be borne in mind that no attempt is made in Act XIV of 1882 to provide a complete Code of Procedure for the High Courts in all branches of their civil judicial work. Nothing is said, for example, as to whether appeals are to be heard by one Judge or by a Bench of two or more Judges. The power given to the Chief Justice to make rules as to such matters under Sections 13 and 14 of 24 and 25 Vic. ch. 104 is not interfered with. If it was intended that the right of appeal given by Section 15 of the Letters Patent from all judgments of a single Judge should be taken away, it is only reasonable to presume that the Code would have gone further and provided as to what judicial acts may be done by a single Judge and what matters should go before a Bench of at least two Judges.