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29. In the Miscellaneous Appeal, Mr. Dutta took an additional ground that the execution was barred by time. In this case, the preliminary decree for sale was passed on 15-11-1951. The First Appeal was preferred on 20-3-1952. The preliminary decree was made final on 1-8-1953. The first application for execution of the final decree was made on 23-9-1953. Thereafter, the vesting occurred. The execution case was dismissed on 27-9-1955 The First Appeal was dropped on 12-5-1959. The second application for execution was presented on 29-7-1959, and the question is whether the second execution is barred by time. If the period of limitation is computed from the date of " the dismissal of the first execution, then the second execution was levied nearly four years thereafter and was manifestly barred by time. If, however, the starting point of limitation is the date of the disposal of the First Appeal, namely, 12-5-1959, then the second execution, having been filed within three years of that order, is well within time. The contention of Mr. Datta is that the second execution must have been filed within three years of the date of disposal of the First execution. On the other hand, Mr. Lalnarain Sinha contended that the computation of the period of limitation must be made from the date of the order of the Court in the First Appeal, i.e., 12-5-1959, because the decree of the Court below merged in the appellate decree. Article 182 of the Limitation Act provides a period of three years for the execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court to be computed, inter alia, from the date of the -decree or order or, where there has been an appeal, from the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court or the withdrawal of the appeal. Thus, where there has been an appeal, limitation for execution under Clause (2) of Article 182 runs from the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court. It is well-settled that the final decree or order has not been used in centra-distinction to the preliminary decree or order of the appellate Court. Therefore, the final decree or order in Clause (2) means final disposal of the appeal, whether the appeal is from a preliminary decree or a final decree. On the plain wording of Clause (2), there is no escape from the conclusion that the period of limitation must be computed from the date of the disposal of the First Appeal. Mr. Datta, however, contended that it was not an appeal from the final decree; the appeal was from a preliminary decree, and, therefore, the order of disposal of the First Appeal does not furnish the starting point of limitation. He referred in this connection to a decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shankar, AIR 1950 SC 6, a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Parmeshwar Prasad, AIR 1951 Pat 1 and a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Latafat Ali Khan v. Kalyan Mal, AIR 1938 All 210. None of these cases has any application. The Supreme Court has laid down that however broadly the words of Clause (2) of Article 182 are construed, it cannot be held to cover an appeal or an order which is passed in a collateral proceeding or which has no direct or immediate connection with the decree under execution. In the present case, the appeal was not an appeal from an order passed in a collateral proceeding. It was an appeal from a preliminary decree. It is true that there was no appeal from the final decree. It is manifest, however, that the final decree follows the preliminary decree, and the result of the appeal from the preliminary decree will certainly affect the final decree. Hence, it cannot be said to be an appeal from an order in a collateral proceeding. The facts of the case of Rameshwar Prasad, AIR 1951 Pat 1 aforesaid before the Full Bench are entirely different. In that case, an ex parte preliminary decree in a suit for partition was passed. An application was filed for setting aside the ex parte decree which was refused, and an appeal was preferred against the order of refusal. In that context, the Full Bench has laid down that the word 'appeal' in Clause (2) of Article 182 does not include an appeal preferred against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte preliminary decree in a suit for partition in computing the period of limitation for executing the final decree passed in such a suit as the word 'appeal' in the clause means an appeal only from the decree or order sought to be executed. This case also is plainly distinguishable. Here, the appeal against the preliminary decree was in essence an appeal from the final decree, because the finality of the final decree depended upon the result of the said appeal. The aforesaid Allahabad case has no application at all. In my opinion, this case is governed by the Bench decisions of this Court in Somar Singh v. Deonandan, AIR 1927 Pat 215 and Somar Singh v. Devanandan Prasad, AIR 1928 Pat 581, and it must be held that the execution was within lime. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha contended in the alternative that the objection to the execution based on the ground of limitation is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. His contention is that the notice under Order 21, Rule 22, in the second execution was served and no objection as to limitation was taken, and, therefore, in view of the decision of the Full Bench in Baijnath Prasad v. Ramphal, AIR 1962 Pat 72, it was barred by limitation (sic). This contention is not valid. In the first place, this objection was not raised in the Court below and all the material facts have not been established; and, in the second place, it appears that the notice under Order 21, Rule 22 had not been served on all the judgment-debtors, and before the notice could be served on the remaining judgment-debtors, the application objecting to the execution was made. This objection, therefore, is not tenable and must be overruled,