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10. Learned Senior Counsel, Sri.S.M.Chandrashekar appearing for the appellant, firstly contended that the K.L.Act is a special legislation which prevails over the general law i.e., the Cr.P.C. with regard to the filing of a private complaint before the special court under Section 200 read with Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. or lodging of information under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. against a public servant. Elaborating the said contention, he stated that both the enactments fall under Entries 1 and 2 of List III (Concurrent List) of Schedule VII of the Constitution. That the procedure prescribed for lodging a complaint are distinct in each enactment. The enactments are inconsistent and are in conflict with each other. For instance under Section 14 of the K.L.Act, the requirement of sanction is done away with, whereas under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., or under Section 19 of P.C. Act sanction is required before launching a prosecution against a public servant. That the scheme of the K.L.Act makes it clear that it is primarily an anti-corruption law, which has an independent body to look into such complaints. As the Lokayukta has the power to investigate, hence, the K.L.Act impliedly repeals the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in the matter of investigation of a public servant. In support of this proposition regarding implied repeal, reliance is placed on the following decisions: T.Barai Vs. Henry AH Hoe & another (1983 (1) SCC 177); Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay [(1955) 1 SCR 799]; Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC 537]; Municipal Council v. T.J. Joseph [(1964) 2 SCR 87] and State of Orissa v. M.A.Tulloch and Co., [(1964) 4 SCR 461]. It was, hence contended that the K.L.Act being a special enactment overrides the provisions of the Cr.P.C. to the extent of investigation and launching of prosecution, which stand impliedly repealed by the provisions of the K.L.Act.

9. But in the instant case, action has been initiated by the respondent by filing a complaint under the provisions of the Cr.P.C., which is a procedural law pertaining to offences allegedly committed by the appellant under the provisions of IPC as well as P.C.Act as applicable to the latter Act. Nevertheless, the principle of implied repeal has been invoked by the appellant's counsel to contend that with the enforcement of the K.L.Act, which is a State enactment, the Cr.P.C. which is a Central enactment is impliedly repealed and hence, the respondent could not have filed any complaint before the Special Judge under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. for an offence punishable under the provisions of the IPC as well as the P.C.Act. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Antulay, there can be no further doubt about the applicability of Section 200 and its allied provisions for filing a complaint against a public servant for an offence punishable under the provisions of the P.C.Act. Though that is indeed the factual situation in these cases, the matter does not rest here. The argument advanced is that the K.L.Act impliedly repeals the provisions of Cr.P.C., which would mean that in so far as the enquiry against the public servant is concerned, it could only be under the provisions of the K.L.Act and that the Cr.P.C. would not be applicable. The analysis of the various enactments made supra and their interplay would not countenance such an argument.

116. Continuing on the aspect of the implied repeal, it has been stated that where two enactments are entirely affirmative and identical, no question of inconsistency would arise [Source G.P.Singh - Interpretation of Statutes -13th Edition of 2012]. In other words, where the operative terms of the two enactments are identical and the enactment are parallel to each other, there would be no scope for the principles of doctrine of implied repeal. Trust Mai Lachhmi Sialkoti Bradari v. Chairman, Amritsar Improvement Trust and Others [AIR 1963 SC 976].

117. Similarly, when similar powers are conferred under two enactments at different levels, it would not result in implied repeal of the prior enactment. There is also no legal bar for creating two sources of power to achieve the same purpose but if the earlier affirmative enactment conferring power of 'A' for the benefit of 'B' was intended to last, only till the same was exercised by 'B' under a later enactment, the assumption of that power by 'B' will result in implied repeal by the earlier enactment.