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Ltd. v. The Union of India & Ors.) he has submitted that, exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. He has submitted that, therefore, the reliefs as sought for by the petitioners be granted.

Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent has questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. He has submitted that, the petitioners have statutory alternative remedy available. He has referred to various provisions of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 particularly Sections 31, 21A, 23L and 23F of the Act of 1956 in support of his contention that, the impugned order is appealable to Securities Appellate Tribunal. He has relied upon two unreported decisions of the Securities Appellate Tribunal being Appeal No. 126 of 2010 dated September 15, 2010 (Bharat Jayantilal Patel v. Securities and Exchange Board of India) and Appeal No. 86 of 2011 (HB Stockholdings Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India and Ors.). Relying upon 2011 Volume 4 Calcutta High Court Notes page 91 (Rose Valley Real Estates and Constructions Ltd v. Securities and Exchange Board of India and others) he has submitted that, the petitioners having statutory alternative remedy of an appeal, the writ petition should not be entertained.

(iv) To what reliefs, if any, are the parties entitled to?

In the present case, the impugned decision of the Calcutta Stock Exchange in refusing to grant in principle approval to delist the equity shares of the first petitioner has been contended to be appealable under Section 21A of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Provisions of Section 23L of the Act of 1956 have also been relied upon to suggest that, appeal to the Security Appellate Tribunal would lie against such a decision of a Stock Exchange.

Section 23L of the Act of 1956 provides for appeals to the Securities Appellate Tribunal. Section 23L is as follows:-
"23L. Appeal to Securities Appellate Tribunal.--
(1) Any person aggrieved, by the order or decision of the recognised stock exchange or the adjudicating officer or any order made by the Securities and Exchange Board of India under section 4B [or sub-section (3) of section 23-I], may prefer an appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal and the provisions of sections 22B, 22C, 22D and 22E of this Act, shall apply, as far as may be, to such appeals.

On a plain reading of Section 23L it appears that, the provisions of such Section of the Act of 1956 allows a person aggrieved by the order or decision of a recognized Stock Exchange or the adjudicating officer or any order made by the Securities and Exchange Board of India to prefer an appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal. There are certain distinctions between Section 21A(2) and Section 23L of the Act of 1956. Section 21A of the Act of 1956 limits the category of the appellant to a listed company or an aggrieved investor while there is no such limitation in Section 23L. Section 23L allows any person who can substantiate that it is aggrieved by the order or decision can prefer the appeal. The time limit to prefer the appeal in the two provisions is different. Section 21A(2) allows 15 days time to prefer the appeal with a provision for considering the delay for a further period not exceeding one month. Section 23L allows the appeal to be preferred within 45 days with the Securities Appellate Tribunal being empowered to condone any quantum of delay in filing the appeal on sufficient cause. Section 21A(2) relates to decisions of the recognized Stock Exchange taken in the process for delisting of the shares. It would include decisions taken in respect of voluntary as well as compulsory delisting. Section 23L on the other hand relates to an appeal in respect of an order or decision of a recognised Stock Exchange or an adjudicating officer or by SEBI passed or taken under Section 4B or Section 23I(3) of the Act of 1956. These differences allow one to infer that they operate on different fields. Provisions of Section 23L are not attracted to an appeal against the decisions of the Stock Exchange taken in the delisting process. Such a decision would attract Section 21A(2) for the purpose of appeal. In the present case, the impugned writing of the Calcutta Stock Exchange contains its decision to refuse in principle approval of voluntary delisting of shares. The same is appealable under Section 21A(2).