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20. This takes us to the second submission of Mr. Shelat. The accident happened in the campus or premises of IPCL. Respondent No. 1 in his deposition has stated that security guard remains present at the gate of IPCL and one has to enter the gate after taking permission. The accident occurred on the road owned by IPCL. There is a road divider in the middle of the road. Suryakant Chimanlal, who was one of the claimants in the other case in this group, in his cross-examination stated that the incident occurred in the compound of IPCL. He said that before entering the premises, one has to take permission from the guard at the gate.

Thus, the panchnama makes it clear that the road was sufficiently wide road. It was a tar road. The two lanes were divided by cement concrete dividers. There is also evidence to show that there were electric poles at intervals on the road. At the time of hearing of this appeal, it was a conceded position that IPCL is a huge complex having a staff township within the premises, and quite a large number of vehicles enter the complex every day, We were told that in the IPCL complex, about 10,000 employees may be working, and staff buses quite large in number might be plying within the complex. It is also not in dispute that all sorts of persons haying business or commercial relations with IPCL, such as contractors, businessmen, transporters, etc. have to visit the complex day in and day out.

There is evidence to show that there is a medical centre or medical complex within the IPCL complex. These facts would clearly show the magnitude of the IPCL complex. It is in the light of these facts that we would have to decide whether the place where the accident happened, should or should not be considered to be a 'public place', within the meaning of that expression used in the relevant' provisions of the Act.

22. In order to find that the place of the accident cannot be termed as a 'public place' within the meaning of that expression used in the relevant provisions of the Act, the Tribunal has relied upon the decision in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rabari Gandu Puhja, (1981) 22 Guj LR 1161 : (AIR 1981 Guj 200). In that case, the accident happened in the compound of Western India Tiles Company, Makansar (Morvi). The learned single Judge of this Court was required to decide in that case whether the place of the accident could be said to be a 'public place'. The learned-Judge there held that the place of the accident could not be said to be a 'public place'. In our opinion, that decision is distinguishable on facts for, there the place of the accident, it appears, was in the compound of a small tiles factory. There were no well laid down roads within the factory premises as we have in the IPCL complex in the case before us. It appears from the report of the case that it was a small tiles factory where some labourers were working, and the truck in question, white being driven in the reverse direction crushed to death a labourer, woman. Such a place cannot be compared, with the place of, the present accident, which was in IPCL complex, the magnitude of which we, have seen, herein-above. In the case before the learned, single Judge, there was nothing to show that quite a large number of persons had access to the tiles factory. Here, as indicated above, thousands of persons must be having access to the IPCL complex every day, and it is to cater to their needs that tar roads have been laid with cement concrete road dividers dividing the uplane and the down lane, and electric poles have been fixed for the proper use of these lanes or roads at night time. These features of the evidence in the case before us; in our opinion would certainly distinguish the place of the accident in the case before us from the place of the accident with which the leaned single Judge of this Court was concerned in the case relied upon by the Tribunal.

28. As said above, in para 10 of the judgment of the Full Bench, the learned Judges of the Full Bench laid down the objects underlying Chapter VIII. We are in full agreement with whatever has been said in paragraph 10 of that judgment. That being so, we need not repeat everything contained therein.

29. Mr. Gandhi submitted that when the definition of the expression 'public place' employs the expression 'right of access', what is meant is an absolute right of public to have access to a place, and once that right is, in any manner restricted, the concerned place would not come within the purview of the expression 'public place'. We are not in a position to accept this submission of Mr. Gandhi. One has to remember that we are concerned with an Act, which was brought in the statute book in 1939. At that time, there must not have been, in this country, such large complexes as IPCL, and the like, or at least there must not have been such large complexes in such large number as we find today, With the increase in industralisation and with the increase in commercialisation in this country, such big establishments are fast coming up, and of necessity, quite a large number of members of the public are, day in and day out, required to enter the campus of such large establishments. May be, for security reason or for some other reason, the establishments might regulate the entry of public into their premises. In some establishments, there might be a system of oral permission to be obtained from the security guard; in some there might be a system of written permission. In some, even without a formal request or permission, there could be presumed permission. But the thing remains that in such large establishments, large number of the members of public, day in and day out, are, of necessity, required to go. If such places are these days held to be not 'public place' within the meaning of the expression as used in the relevant provisions of the Act, the whole object underlying the scheme of compulsory insurance under Chapter VIII of the Act would be frustrated. When we talk of entry of large number o'f members of public in such establishments, we include therein, entry of vehicles. As could be seen from the facts of the present case as also, as could be seen from the facts of the case decided by the Bombay High Court, though the premises of IPCL and TELCO may be private premises, many vehicles ply therein; roads are laid down, electric poles are laid down and large number of members of public either on foot or by means of vehicles have ingress to and egress from such premises. If, on a narrow construction of the expression 'public place' such establishments or premises of such establishments are kept out of the purview of the expression 'public place', in quite a large number of cases, the schemes of compulsory insurance would be frustrated.