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3. Applicant challenged the order of trial Court in the above revision. At the time of hearing, learned single Judge noticed contrary views taken in the decisions of this Court reported in (1994) 2 DMC 548 and 1995 (I) MPWN (SN) 2. Learned single Judge also noticed views taken by Delhi and Kerala High Courts reported in AIR 1990 Delhi 146 and AIR 1998 Kerala 97 respectively where waiting for six months in a given set of facts and circumstances was held to be director. In view of conflict of views taken in Manju Kohli's case (1997 (1) Jab LJ 32) (supra) and view taken in (1994) 2 DMC 548 and 1995 (1) MPWN (SN) 2, the previously mentioned question was framed, and referred to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for suitable order. Hon'ble the Chief Justice constituted division Bench to hear and decide the matter. That is how the matter is before us.

6. Shri Kochatta, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the view taken by learned single Judge in Manju Kohli's case (1997 (1) Jab LJ 32) is based upon the view taken by the Supreme Court in Sureshta Devi reported in AIR 1992 SC 1904. The propriety of the aforesaid view itself has been questioned by the Supreme Court in the later decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 1266. Shri Kochatta, therefore, submitted that the view taken in Manju Kohli's case does not represent the correct interpretation of the Sub-section (2) of Section 13B of the Act. He submitted that the view taken in Padmini v. Hemant Singh reported (1994) 2 DMC 548 and Ravi v. Madhu Arora, 1995 (1) MPWN (SN) 2 and Mahesh Kumar v. Sunita, 1998 (2) MPWN (SN) 56 are the correct views and the same should be approved. He also referred to another single Bench decision reported in 2000 (1) DMC 490, Smt. Ratna Kanthale v. Rajendra Kanthale.

11. From the decisions cited, it is clear that provision of sub-section (2) of Section 13B has been held to be directory and not mandatory. This appears to be the consistent view.

12. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the considered opinion of this Court, the law laid down in Manju Kohli's case (1997 (1) Jab LJ 32) does not represent the correct law specially in view of the fact that in a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court itself has doubted the correctness of the view taken in the earlier decision reported in AIR 1992 SC 1904. We, therefore, overrule the decision given in Manju Kohli's case and approve the view taken in Padmini v. Hemant Singh reported (1994) 2 DMC 548; Ravi v. Madhu Arora, 1995 (1) MPWN (SN) 2; Mahesh Kumar v. Sunita, 1998 (2) MPWN (SN) 56; Smt. Ratna Kanthale v. Rajendra Kanthale, (2000) 1 DMC 490; Deepak v. Rani, 2000 (2) MPLJ (SN) 26; Smt. Preetha Nair v. Gopkumar, (2001) 2 DMC 170; Deepak Kulkarni v. Tanuja, 2003 (2) Jab LJ 121 and hold that in a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) pending for more than six months and thereafter, during the pendency of the petition, if a joint application is 'made for divorce on mutual consent, the Court, subject to fulfillment of mandatory provisions of Section 13B(1), the Court in a given case need not wait for six months and can pass a decree after holding the enquiry as indicated hereinabove without waiting for the expiry of six months from the date of presentation.