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Even a plain reading of Clause (1) thereof would make it manifest that it pertains to three aspects and nothing more, namely, (i) traffic in human beings, (ii) begar and (iii) other similar forms of forced labour. Plainly enough no question of traffic in human beings arises in the present situation and, indeed, it was not even remotely so argued The basic issue, therefore, is whether a mere refusal of contractual or status remuneration would be begar or forced labour. The word 'begar' has not been defined in the Constitution itself but it is sought to be defined by Molseworth as "labour or service exacted by a Government or a person in power without giving remuneration for it". Again in Wilson's Glossary it is described as-

"forced labour, one pressed to carry burden for individuals or public, under old system when pressed for public service no pay was given."

It would thus appear that invoking the concept of begar in the field of public service and remuneration therefor is something wholly bizzare. Such a contention forgets the long drawn out historical retrospect of the evil institution of begar in our country which Article 23 sought to prohibit. It needs no great erudition to recall that begar was a relic of a dictatorial practice of feudal times earlier in the country where hordes of weaker subjects were compelled to bondage and forced labour and, therefore, Article 23 sought to prohibit and abolish the same and even envisaged that it should be made an offence punishable in accordance with law. Therefore the analogy of begar in its historical perspective as against a claim to remuneration and salary for the voluntary rendering of public service is so remote as to be bordering on the irrelevant

34. What would then call for notice is the fact that Article 23 envisages some kind of force or involuntariness in the commandeered labour. The learned Advocate-General had attempted to argue that the phrase "other similar forms of forced labour" must be read as ejusdem generis to the previous two concepts of traffic in human beings and begar. This is now no longer tenable in view of the recent precedent in People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473. Therein the word 'forced' has been liberally construed so as to include not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves no choice or alternative to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service. However, even keeping that in mind, a degree of involuntariness and compulsion is still inherent in the concept of forced labour under Article 23. Consequently, the very basis of a voluntary agreement either by contract or status and the seeking and joining of government service would negate the concept of begar or forced labour. Therefore, the issue herein is whether the respondent State has forced and compelled anyone to work or labour for it. The learned Advocate-General was eminently right in contending that in these cases the boot is on the other leg and it is the petitioners who, on the basis of forged, fraudulent and illegal letters of appointment claim to have thrust and imposed themselves upon the State and entered wrongfully in the precincts of public service. It was highlighted that far from being forced to work the State Government in the eye of law had never even offered them to work and there was no appointment as such. Consequently, the very sheet anchor of An. 23 in the context of forced labour even when most liberally construed would disappear.

Again in Dubar Goala v. Union of India, AIR 1952 Cal 496, Bose, J., had occasion to consider the concept of 'forced labour' and 'begar' under Article 23 and concluded as under :--

"Coming now to the question whether the work done by the petitioners can be regarded as begar or forced labour within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the Constitution it appears to me that upon the facts of this case it cannot be said that the petitioners are doing begar or forced labour. As I have pointed out already the very idea that the petitioners had voluntarily agreed to do this extra work by entering into a contract to that effect repeals the idea of theirwork beinga forced labour."