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4.3 It is submitted that the Magistrate is approached by the complainant alleging that the police officer has not registered the FIR. Hence, there cannot be a mismatch between the duty of the police officer under section 154(1) and the contours of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage. It is submitted that if so understood, the test of veracity enabled in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) can only be to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is in fact made out or not. It cannot receive an interpretation, divorced of the context and the dictum in Lalita Kumari (supra). If so, there will be a mismatch between Section 154(1) and Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) cannot lead to a conclusion that the Magistrate can delve into the credibility of the complainant/witnesses and the acceptability of the allegations made by her. It is submitted that Priyanka Srivastava (supra) was not intended to confer such a jurisdiction.

5.3 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the original complainant that as held by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for registration of an FIR. It is further observed and held that use of word “shall” in Section 154 Cr.P.C. is a mandate to register the FIR and the rule of literal construction would apply. It is submitted that as per the decision of this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), only in exceptional cases, before registering the FIR, the preliminary enquiry by the concerned police officer is held to be permissible. It is submitted that, however, when the offence alleged is against the woman and when there are serious allegations of rape made, there is no question of holding any further preliminary enquiry at the stage of Section 156(3) application.

5.5 It is further submitted that noting the rise of crime against women, the Criminal Amendment Act (13 of 2013) was promulgated amending Section 154(1) Cr.P.C, Section 173(1A) Cr.P.C and Section 166A, IPC. It is submitted that the procedural requirement to compulsorily register an FIR was already existing in Section 154 Cr.P.C. but required the judicial interpretation in Lalita Kumari (supra) to be a mandate. The insertion of section 166A to the IPC has made the non-registration of complaint as FIR containing a cognizable offence, liable to penal consequences against the public servant (police). It is submitted that therefore it is the duty of the police to register the FIR on the basis of the complaint disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and non-registration of a complaint as FIR is now offence.

Therefore, as such, the subsequent order passed by the learned CJM is a consequential order passed by the High Court on quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned CJM dismissing the application/complaint.

7. It is the contention on behalf of the appellants – original accused that at the stage of deciding the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it is open for the Magistrate to verify the truth and veracity of the allegations, regard being had to the nature of the allegations of the case, and at that stage, the Magistrate has to apply the judicial mind. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra); Maksud Saiyed (supra); Anil Kumar (supra); and Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 435, as also, on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mukul Roy (supra). It is the case on behalf of the appellants that the High Court has materially erred in relying upon and/or following the decision of this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), while holding that at the stage of considering the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to verify the truth and veracity of the allegations. It is submitted that however the said decision shall not be applicable in a case where the Magistrate exercises the powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is submitted that in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), this Court was considering the powers of the police officer under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and to register the FIR. It is submitted that the powers exercised by the Magistrate at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C shall not be and/or cannot be equated with the powers to be exercised by the police officer under Section 154 Cr.P.C.