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Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide Subject to certain if the act by which the death exceptions culpable is caused is done homicide is murder if the act by which the death caused is done--

INTENTION
	 (a) with the intention of
	causing death:			   (1) with the	 intention
					     of causing death;
		 or					   or
	 (b) with the intention of	   (2) with the intention of
	 causing such bodily injury	   causing such bodily inju-

Clause (b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowl- edge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under cl. (2) of s. 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the he,art, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an inten- tion to. cause death or bodily injury sufficient 'in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.

Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra) even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to s. 300 clearly brings out this point.

Clause (c) of s. 299 and cl. (4) of s. 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that cl. (4) of s. 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general--as distinguished from a particular person or persons---being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Question arose whether in such a case when no signifi- cant injury had been inflicted on a vital art of the body, and the weapons used were ordinary lathis, and the accused could not be said to have the intention of causing death, the offence would be 'murder' or merely 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. This Court speaking through Hidayatullah J. (as he then was), after explaining the comparative scope of and the distinction between ss. 299 and 300, answered the question in these terms: