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1. This appeal, which has been referred to a Division Bench by Sharfuddin Ahmed, J., as he dissented from the decisions in Public Prosecutor v. Mangaldas Thakker, 1957-2 Andh WR 455: (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 79), and Lakshmaiah Naidu v. State, , raises questions as to the construction and effect of Section 117 of the Factories Act (LXIII of 1948), hereinafter called the Act.

2. The material facts are briefly these. At 12.30 p.m. on 14-7-1959, the Additional Inspector of Factories at Gudivada (P. W. 1) visited the factory known as "Sri, Rama Seshasayi Rice Mill" and found one woman worker by name Karra Lakshmamma, working at the paddy sieve. This was beyond the period of work from 8.30 A.M. to 12 noon fixed for her beforehand under Section 61 and was, therefore, a contravention of Section 63 of the Act. Consequently, the respondent, who was the manager of the factory, was prosecuted for having committed an offeree punishable under Section 92 of the Act. The respondent's defence was that Karra Lakshmamma was a piecetime worker, that she was paid extra wages for working overtime from 12 Noon to 1 p.m. as required by Section 59 of the Act and that the respondent bona fide believed that he could employ casual labour overtime, subject to the payment of overtime wages. The trial Magistrate observed that the facts were on all fours with the case in . He accordingly held that on a reading of Sections 59 and 63 of the Act together, it is not illegal to employ a casual worker overtime, if the worker was compensated by overtime wages. He also held that even if any of the provisions of the Act have been contravened, there was no mens rea on the part of the respondent, which ingredient has to be established by the prosecution by reason of Section 117 of the Act. On these grounds, he acquitted the accused and the Public Prosecutor, on behalf of the State Government, has come upon appeal against of the acquittal.

Section 117. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act."

4. In 1957-2 Andh WR 455: (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 79) the manager of a tobacco factory was prosecuted for the contravention of Section 63 or the Act, inasmuch as he had allowed the workers to work on a particular day beyond 5-30 p. m. which was the limit specified for their period or work. His defence was that on account of heavy rainfall, the workers came late and started work at 9 a. m. instead of at 7-30 A. M. and that they worked beyond 5-30 p. m. in order to make up their full hours of work for the day. The trial Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that there was no mens rea and that no offence had therefore been committed. The Public Prosecutor appealed against the order of acquittal. Kumarayya, J. dismissed the appeal, holding that as the accused had acted in good faith Section 117 protected him and that the language of the section was wide enough to cover not only officers or servants of the Govt. but also managers who had certain duties cast upon them by the Act. In support of his view of Section 117, Kumarayya, J. referred to two cases reported under the title Ranjit Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Oudh 308; Ranjit Singh V. Emperor, AIR 1943 Oudh 311 and decided by Thomas C. J. of the Oudh Chief Court. In these two cases, one of the grounds for setting aside the convictions under Section 60 of the Factories Act (25 of 1934) was that there was no deliberate breach of the rules on the part of the occupier or manager.

6. The correctness of the view of the law taken in these decisions is assailed before us by the Public Prosecutor. It is argued in the first place that Section 117 is intended to protect only persons like the inspecting staff, on whom powers are conferred by the Act and does not apply at all to occupiers or managers of factories, on whom obligations are imposed. Reliance is placed on the decision in Provincial Government v. Chapsi Dhanji, AIR 1938 Nag 406 where a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court dealing with Section 81 of Act 25 of 1934 corresponding to Section 117 observed:--

8-9. The main question for consideration is the meaning of the expression, "anything which is done or intended to be done under this Act" occurring in Section 117. The learned Public Prosecutor, contends that this would certainly not include anything done in contravention of the Act, while the learned counsel for the respondent takes the position that it covers all matters that can be connected with the Act. The learned Public Prosecutor relies on the construction of Section 11 of the East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 84. B. K. Mukerjea, J. observed at p. 88 "Section 11 of the Act is in the following terms: