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16. In view of the said decision, we are not now concerned with the truth, validity and genuineness of the original trust deed dated March 1, 1954. We are now concerned only with the validity of the supplementary deed dated June 28, 1961, which has been executed by the founder of the trust presumably taking note of the definition of "charitable object" contained in s. 2(15) of the Act and the exemption provision contained in s. 11 of the 1961 Act.

17. The Revenue, first, submits that the founder of the trust had no power to alter or modify the objects of the trust and the power given to the founder of the trust in cl 3(j) to executed supplementary instruments for the proper administration of the trust will not enable him to execute the supplementary deed in question modifying the objects of the original trust. The Tribunal has accepted the said submission and held that under the general law of trusts, the author of the trust has no power to alter the terms or objects of the trust unless such a power is reserved, that clause 3(j) of the trust deed cannot be taken to be such a reservation, as that clause only enables the founder to give to the trustees such directions as may be required for the proper administration of the trust, that is, for carrying out the objects of the trust as laid down in the original trust deed, that the said clause cannot confer on the founder of the trust a right to alter or modify the objects of the trust which the trustees are bound to carry out under the original trust deed, and that, therefore, the supplementary deed dated June 28, 1961, cannot be considered as valid. Though this finding of the Tribunal has been challenged before us by the learned counsel appearing for the trust on the ground that the Tribunal has misunderstood the scope of clause 3(j) of the trust deed, we are not inclined to go into that question. The Tribunal has held that even if the supplementary deed was not valid, the decree in C.S. No. 90 of 1961 creates a valid legal obligation on the trustees to spend the income of the trust on the charitable objects set out in the schedule to the decree, and that will attract s. 11 of the Act. The findings alone are the subject-matter of the first three questions referred to us. The question as to whether the Tribunal is right in holding that the founder of the trust has no power to modify or add to the objects of the original trust and as such the supplementary deed is not valid has not been specifically referred to us. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to go into that question, though the Revenue has also invited us to go into that question and has referred to the decision in CIT v. S. Ramaswami Iyer [1977] 110 ITR 364 (Mad). We, therefore, refrain from going into that question on the ground that it has not been specifically referred to us as arising out of the decision of the Tribunal.

18. The Revenue next contends that (1) the Tribunal is in error in holding that the decree in C.S. No. 90 of 1961 creates a legal obligation on the trustees to expend the income of the trust for the charitable objects referred to in the schedule to the decree and as such the trust is entitled to claim exemption under s. 11. (2) Even if the supplementary deed executed by the founder is valid and bringing on the trust as a result of the decision of this court in C.S. No. 90 of 1961, since since the original objects, which contemplate the carrying on of an activity for profit, still continue, the trust is not one for charitable purposes as contemplated by s. 11 read with s. 2(15) of the 1961 Act. (3) No property is held in trust for the new objects set out in the supplementary deed and the schedule to the decree under the original deed has been directed to be spent for the new objects and as such s. 11 cannot apply to the new objects, for which no separate property had been endowed or are held in trust, and (4) The decision in C.S. No. 90 of 1961 does not decide the question of the validity of the supplementary deed and, therefore, it is open to the Revenue to question the validity of the supplementary deed and that, in any event, the decision a friendly action in which the Revenue as it has been rendered in a friendly action in which the Revenue had not say. We ill not deal with the above contentions seriatim.

19. As already pointed out, the 1961 Act has brought about a slight change in the matter of grant of exemption for the income spent on charitable objects. Section 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act provided for an exemption from tax of any income derived from property held, under trust or other legal obligation, wholly for religious and charitable purposes, in so far as such income had been applied or accumulated for application to such religious or charitable purposes, and in the case of property so held in part only for such purposes, the income applied or finally set apart for application thereto. Section 2(15) of the 1961 Act, however, defined "charitable purpose" as including relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit. Section 11(1) provides for an exemption of the income from property held under trust for charitable or religious purposes. The question is whether the income from the trust created by the original trust deed and as modified by the supplementary deed will fall within the exemption provided in s. 11(1)(a). It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the Revenue that since the objects mentioned in the original trust deed involves the running of a press which is admittedly an activity for profit, the original trust, even as modified by the supplementary deed, cannot be taken to be fore charitable purposes and, therefore, the trust is not entitled to claim the benefit of the exemption under s. 11. According to the learned counsel for the Revenue, if the object of the trust is the advancement of an object of general public utility involving the carrying on of any activity for profit, then it will cease to be a charitable purpose as defined in s. 2(15). In this case, admittedly the trust is carrying on newspaper business for profit. But the question is whether the trust as modified, whose entire income has to be spent exclusively for carrying on charitable objects will cease to be charitable merely because it carries on an activity for profit. Section 2(15), which defines "charitable purpose", excludes advancement of any other object of general public utility involving the carrying on of an activity for profit. Under the 1922 Act even such an object will be charitable purpose. Section 11(1)(a) exempts income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes under certain conditions and subject to certain limitations. Section 11(1)(b) exempts income derived from property held under trust in part for such purposes subject to certain limitations. Section 11(4) says that for purposes of s. 11 the expression "property held under trust" includes a business undertaking so held. As per this section, the business carried on by the trust is also treated as a property held under trust. Explanation (1) to s. 13 says that for the purposes of ss. 11, 12, 12(a) and 13, "trust" includes any other legal obligation. In view of this Explanation, the expression "property held under trust" occurring in s. 11 has to be understood as "property held under trust or any other legal obligation". In this respect, there is not much difference between s. 4 of the 1922 Act and s. 11 of the 1961 Act, for, s. 4 specifically refers to the property held under trust or other legal obligation. Thus, the only change brought about in the 1961 Act is that if the main and predominant object of the trust is to carry on an activity for profit, that object cannot be taken to be a charitable purpose for purposes of s. 11. Why such a change has been brought about has been explained by the then Finance Minister on the floor of the Rajya Sabha as follows as seen from the official report of the Parliamentary debates dated 4th September, 1961, at columns 2922 and 2923 :

36. In this case the founder of the trust has clearly evinced an intention to create a public charitable trust as seen from the preamble and cl 3(k) of the original trust deed and the charitable objects referred to in the schedule to the decree in C.S. No. 90 of 1961 have to be fulfilled from and out of the income from the business which is directed to be held under trust or other legal obligation. Those charitable objects fall within the first 2 categories referred to in s. 2(15), viz., relief of the poor and education. It is to carry out and fulfil those objects the business is being carried on. Thus, the primary purpose is to carry out the charitable objects and the business is carried on as a means in the course of the actual carrying out of that primary purpose and not as an end in itself. While the predominant object of the trust is the carrying out of the charitable objects referred to in two of the three categories of charitable purposes referred to in s. 2(15), the carrying on of the business which is actually the property held under trust or other legal obligation is incidental, and the profit resulting from the business can be taken to be a by-product. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court in Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Mfs. Assn. , it is not possible to accept the case of the Revenue that the trust in this case cannot claim the benefit of exemption under s. 11 merely because it carries on a commercial activity for profit. We have to, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the Tribunal that the trust in this case can claim the benefit of s. 11, if 75% of its income has been applied for charitable purposes and answer questions Nos. 1 to 3 in the affirmative and against the Revenue.