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(iv) that the check off system promotes unionisation;
(v) that the check off system does not involve any special expenditure for verification, whereas the administrative cost of a secret ballot, especially when it has to be held in a multi unit undertaking goes to crores of rupees and the development of a formidable number of polling officers;
(vi) that this raises the question of the source from which Page 0010 the money to defray the expenditure on the secret ballot should come, whether it should be from the management or workers or the Government. The management is reluctant, and some times, unable to find such a large sum of money; the Trade Union does not have the resources, and the Government too is unwilling to find the money from the exchequer;

6.71. A check off system has the advantage of ascertaining the relative strengths of trade unions based on continuing loyalty reflected by the regular payment of union subscription, even if such subscriptions are deducted from the wages as permitted under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Also, the check off system by and large, avoids the incidence of dual membership under which, for a variety of reasons, a worker may become member of more than one union. Given the low level of unionisation in India, neither the check off system nor the secret ballot confined to members of registered unions is like to throw up a negotiating agent which commands the support of the majority of workers, excepting in industries and establishments where the degree of unionisation is very high. The argument advanced against the check off system is that Page 0011 it exposes the loyalty of the worker, and this may make him vulnerable to victimisation by the management or persecution by members of other unions. We feel that this argument does not have much force today, when conscientisation and legal rights have more or less done away with the fear that workers had in the early days of trade unionism in the country. Today, it is commonly accepted even by employers that workers have the freedom to join trade unions of their choice. There may be exceptional cases of victimisation and vendetta. But they are exceptions, and not the vogue.

It is thus clear that for rejecting the check off system of verification of membership as late as 2002, the IInd National Commission for Labour has preferred the check off system to the method of secret ballot.

12. We may now consider the judgment in Automobile Products of India Employees Union (supra). The matter arose from the provisions of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act. The recognition of unions under the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act is covered by Sections 10 to Section 18 of the Act. We may note from the provisions of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act that it has granted statutory recognition to the method of verification of membership to determine the majority character of the union. The procedure laid down for verification is based on the membership, six months pervious to the date of application. The respondent Union there was the recognised union. The appellant union claiming majority of membership applied for cancellation of recognition of the first respondent union. The application by appellant union was allowed. It was, however, set aside by the High Court. The appellant Union thereafter made a fresh application for recognition as majority union. A suggestion was made for deciding, as to which of the unions had majority, by secret ballot, which was accepted. In the polls that were held, the appellant union secured majority of the votes. The Industrial Court thereafter passed an order granting recognition to the appellant union. The prayer for cancellation of recognition of the Respondent No. 1 was also granted. Two writ Petitions were filed before this Court. Both Petitions were allowed. The contentions raised, that the Industrial Court had violated the statutory provisions of the Act for grant of recognition of the Union, by adopting the procedure of secret Page 0012 ballot, which was not sanctioned by the Act and therefore, it was illegal and invalid, was upheld. An appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court. The issue before the Supreme Court was, whether the procedure adopted by the Industrial Court for granting recognition to the appellant union was illegal. The Supreme Court noted that though there was a strong demand from some sections for recognizing the bargaining agent of the workmen by a secret ballot or otherwise, the National Labour Commission did not countenance it for certain obvious reasons. It was felt that the elective element would introduce unhealthy trends which would be injurious to the trade union movement, for industrial peace and stability and endanger the interests of the workers, the employers and the society as a whole. After examining the various provisions, the Supreme Court held that what the Industrial Court did by permitting recognition of the union by secret ballot, was by a method clearly derogatory to the Act. The court observed as under:

Page 0014 The Code of Discipline has emerged from a consensus on the part of Industries and Unions to recognise the union holding majority membership. This need was felt to avoid multiplicity of unions and to act as a sole collective bargaining agent so that as far as possible there would be one union speaking on behalf of the workmen in the industry or establishment as the case may be. Nonetheless, in so far as the Code of Discipline is concerned, it still recognises the representative union in the industry as whole and as majority union in the establishment. We may note that in Food Corporation of India (supra) the Supreme Court had noted that the "Check off system" which once prevailed in this domain has lost its appeal, and so, efforts are on to find out which other system can foot the bill. As we have earlier noted the report of the Second Labour Commission which came out in the year 2002, has reiterated the advantages of check off system as set out in Para 6.72 of that report. That the majority union should collectively bargain on behalf of the workmen is to avoid conflicting demands of minority unions; some times totally irrelevant, which could result in hampering the industrial harmony and pivotal for functioning of an industry. Determining the majority character of an union is an important step in identifying the union, who will represent the workmen in the collective bargaining process. A procedure adopted at the Indian Labour conference, representing the collective will of employers and unions and borne our of their experience at the ground level, should not normally be interfered with by courts, not specialised in the intricacies of collective bargaining.